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INTRODUCTION
New York City is home to two of the largest public housing providers
in the nation: the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) and, lesser
known but nearly as impressive in scope, the New York City Department
of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) housing program.1
HPD's in rem-or City owned-program oversees 3,200 occupied and
1,500 vacant buildings that have been abandoned by their original owners,
totalling over 11,000 units.2 Since 1978, the City has taken ownership of
buildings where the private sector had been unable to provide decent, af-
fordable housing for low- and moderate-income tenants.3 The City has
managed this dilapidated housing stock and created programs to dispose of
it to the private for-profit and non-profit sectors. Programs designed to
return the housing to for-profit landlords, in particular, have been contro-
versial because of their reliance upon the very sector that abandoned the
housing in the first place. One such program, the Private Ownership and
Management Program (POMP), did return buildings to the for-profit sec-
tor but was terminated after numerous complaints. There were high evic-
tion rates, rents unaffordable to low-income tenants, and patterns of poor
management. New York City is initiating a new program, the Neighbor-
hood Entrepreneur Program (NEP), to replace POMP, but it may have
problems similar to those of its predecessor.
This article reviews and evaluates the debate surrounding the manage-
ment and disposition of city-owned housing in New York City, paying par-
ticular attention to those programs that rely on for-profit landlords. The
first section reviews the theory and history of housing abandonment by the
private sector and the City's responses to it. The second section documents
the history of POMP and summarizes the studies that have been made of it
by the City, the business-centered advocacy community, and the tenant-
centered advocacy community. The third section documents the recent im-
plementation of NEP and preliminary evaluations of it. The final section
evaluates these two programs against criteria chosen by the City and ana-
lyzes the viability of relying on for-profit landlords as a solution to housing
abandonment.
The primary purpose of this article is to compile the rich, but scat-
tered, literature on in rem housing in New York City. Without a central
repository for housing information, the City's policy is difficult to study.
1. See Anthony DePalma, New York Plays Reluctant Landlord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1986, § 8, at 1.
2. Alan S. Oser, The New Approach on Tax-Delinquent Property, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1996, §9, at 7; Arthur Andersen Consulting, Breaking the Cycle: Developing an Effective
Intervention Strategy for Dealing with New York City's In Rem Housing Problem Schedule
2 (1995) (detailing economic impact of City's in rem stock) (unpublished study prepared for
HPD, on file with author) [hereinafter Breaking the Cycle].
3. Thomas J. Lueck, Federally Subsidized Housing At Risk, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 1, 1990,
§ 10, at 1.
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Adding to this difficulty is the ephemeral nature of the information, con-
sisting primarily of unofficial reports and unpublished papers. This article
is intended to digest and preserve vital information on housing policy that
otherwise might be lost in the loose sheets of press releases and position
papers. Finally, I hope to make some modest suggestions about the course
that the in rem debate should take.
I.
HOUSING ABANDONMENT
A. Abandonment in General
Housing abandonment became a major problem for American cities in
the 1970s. In a 1978 study by the General Accounting Office, 113 of 149
responding cities reported having an abandonment problem.4 While the
increasing number of homeless people might suggest that the demand for
housing outpaces its supply, the quality of many cities' housing stock has
declined to the point of abandonment. The reasons for abandonment are
complex.
The housing stock is affected by urban rhythms. As tenants seek to get
the best housing value for their rent dollars, they move from one unit to
another. Wealthy people move from older housing to newer housing, less
wealthy people replace them, and so on down the line. The poor tend to
live in the worst housing. The most wretched housing, incapable of gener-
ating enough income to be profitable for the landlord, is ultimately aban-
doned. Economists have labelled this process 'filtering.'5 Most older cities,
including New York, were built from the inside out. In some instances,
improvements in transportation made land in central locations less profita-
ble to landlords than land away from central locations. As a result of filter-
ing, then, some of the oldest and worst housing is located closest to the
economic centers of the cities.
Filtering alone, however, does not explain abandonment. Some com-
mentators have noted that abandonment has a 'contagious' aspect in which
good housing stock is infected by the nearby abandonment of poor housing
stock so that an entire low-income community, such as the South Bronx, is
devastated.6 This contagion effect has been linked to vicious cycles involv-
ing financial insecurity on the part of local landowners, reduction in the
4. Sarah Hovde, An Early Stage Assessment of the Giuliani Administration's 'Building
Blocks!' Initiative 15 (1995) (citing to U.S. GENERAL ACCOUrNING OFFICE, HOUSING
ABANDoNMENT. A NATIONAL PROBLEM NEEDING NEW APPROACHES (1978)) (unpublished
M.S. thesis, Columbia University, on file with author).
5. EDWrN S. MLLs, URAN ECONOMICS 228 (1989).
6. Hovde, supra note 4, at 16 (citing Peter Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment and
Displacement Connections, Causes, and Policy Responses in NYC, 28 J. URBAN & CON-
TEMP. L. 209 (1985); Flora Sellers Davidson, City Policy and Housing Abandonment: A
Case Study of New York City, 1965-1973, at ii (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Co-
lumbia University); PErER MARCUSE, HOUSING IN THE Crry OF NEw YORK: SUPPLY AND
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local quality of life, and declining property values. Other commentators
have emphasized that increasing poverty and demographic changes also
play a role in abandonment.7
Perhaps most important for our discussion, private sector housing fol-
lows a simple rule: to remain as decent, well-maintained private housing,
buildings must have a cash flow sufficient to maintain viability.8 The deci-
sion to abandon a building is often carefully calculated by a landlord who
wants to maximize profit. A landlord compares the expected costs of an
aging building with the potential profit to be made by providing housing to
the very poor. The landlord may decide a few years in advance to abandon
a building, after evaluating whether it could be more profitably sold, de-
molished or reused. Once the decision to abandon is made, the landlord
will stop paying property taxes, reducing operating expenses by roughly
one-third.9 Closer to the expected abandonment date, the landlord will
stop maintenance altogether, reducing costs by another one-third.10 Over a
period of about 5 years, it may be possible for a landlord to save approxi-
mately 25% of the initial value of the property in operating expenses, as
compared with demolition and resale."
Commentators do not agree on how to avoid abandonment. Some
suggest reducing government-mandated expenses such as taxes, 2 water
and sewer charges, 3 and Housing Code compliance. Others suggest limit-
ing liability for dangers inherent in older buildings, like lead paint.1 4 While
CONDITION, 1975-1978, at 70 (1979); U.S.G.A.O., HOUSING ABANDONMENT: A NATIONAL
PROBLEM NEEDING NEW APPROACHES (1978); LINTON, MIELDS, AND COSTON, INC., A
STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF ABANDONED HOUSING 2, 7 (1971)).
7. Frank P. Braconi, In Re In Rem: Innovation and Expediency in New York's Housing
Policy (unpublished paper, on file with author).
8. CITIZENS HOUSING AND PLANNING COUNCIL oF NEW YORK, INC., PRESERVING
NEw YORK'S LOW-INCOME HOUSING STOCK 8 (1992).
9. See Michael J. White, Property Taxes and Urban Housing Abandonment, 20 J. URB.
ECON. 312, 312-30 (1986) (arguing that if land values decline and tax assessment is done
every few years, then property taxes represent an increasing portion of the operating costs
of low-income housing, enhancing the incentive to abandon).
10. MILLS, supra note 5, at 224.
11. See CITIZENS HOUSING AND PLANNING COUNCIL OF NEW YORK, INC., In Rem:
Recommendations for Reform 1 (1981) [hereinafter In Rem: Recommendations].
12. See MILL, supra note 5, at 224 (noting that while typical central city property tax
liability is only about 2 percent of true market value, "low-quality housing tends to be over-
assessed while high-quality housing tends to be underassessed").
13. CITIZENS HOUSING AND PLANNING COUNCIL OF NEW YORK, INC., PRESERVING
NEW YORK's LOW-INcoME HoustNo STOCK 2 (1992) (arguing that "[c]urrent metering and
fee schedules fail to encourage resource conservation and are highly regressive in their eco-
nomic impact") [hereinafter PR"SERVING].
14. See Lloyd Chrein, Unhappily Ever After, Good Intentions Can't Save Some Land.
lords from Losing Their Buildings, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 13, 1995, at D1 (reporting that the
cost of abating lead has increased to a minimum of $2,000; costs may reach $15,000 if a
resident child is found to have elevated lead levels). See also Matthew Purdy, New York
Girding for Surge in Suits over Lead Paint, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at Al.
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some suggest that rent restrictions be removed so that rents can be in-
creased, and/or that tenants be subsidized so that they can afford higher
rents, others argue that improving City enforcement of tax and code laws
will force landlords to maintain habitable housing.15
B. Abandonment in New York City
Abandonment hit New York City's neighborhoods like a firestorm. 6
Cash flow problems have arisen for the City's landlords for a variety of
reasons: incomes among the poor and working classes have not kept pace
with inflation, public assistance payments have generally fallen behind
housing costs, 17 housing costs have increased dramatically, rent regulation
has limited the revenue in some buildings, and the City's population has
declined.' 8 Adding to the severity of the problem, many of the abandoned
buildings in New York are occupied or partially occupied, while abandoned
buildings in other cities are generally vacant.19
It was clear by the mid-1970s that New York City had an abandonment
crisis. In 1976, the City owned 4,611 multifamily buildings through in rem
proceedings.20 More than a fifth of the City's multifamily residential
properties were in arrears. Fourteen percent of those in arrears had been
delinquent for more than three years, making them subject to foreclosure
proceedings after three years.21 In most cases, the City could not assume
responsibility for buildings until such proceedings were final. They fre-
quently lasted as long as two years and buildings continued to deteriorate
in the interim as landlords milked them for rent.
The New York City Council responded to the crisis in 1976 by passing
Local Law #45,2 authorizing in rem tax foreclosure by the City against
property owing one year or more in real estate taxesP The City soon be-
came the owner of approximately 11,700 residential multiple dwellings,
15. THE COMMISSION ON THE YEAR 2000, NEW YORK ASCENDAr 145 (1987) (advo-
cating strong enforcement of housing laws: "Our theme.. .that every lawbreaker's encoun-
ter with the law must be taken seriously should apply as strongly to landlords as we argue it
should to muggers").
16. See Sam Howe Verhovek, After Exodus, Hope Comes to a South Bronx Block, N.Y.
TImEs, Nov. 10, 1987, at B1 (describing, in detail, the abandonment of one block).
17. Jack Newfield, THi PERNANEr GovERNN iNr. WHO REALLY RULES NEW
YoRK? 268-69 (1981). See also, Alan Finder, Barely Four Walls: Housing's Hidden Crisis,
N.Y. Trams, Oct. 11, 1996, at B1.
18. IN REM: Recommendations, supra note 11, at 1.
19. MICHAEL STEGMAN, THE CrTY OF NEw YoRK DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESER-
VATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HousInG AND VACANY REPORT. NEW YoRK Cri'y, 1937, at
207 (1988). See also Robert Friedman, For Too Many, There's No Place Like Home, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Jan. 22, 1989, at 5.
20. Hovde, supra note 4, at 23-24.
21. I. at 23.
22. Harry DeRienzo and Joan B. Allen, The New York City In Rein Housing Program:
A Report 4 (1985) (unpublished report prepared for the New York Urban Coalition, on file
with author).
23. N.Y.C. ADMN. CODE § 11-412 (1976).
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home to about 35,000 households.2 4 Local Law #45 was both intended as a
tax enforcement measure against delinquent landlords and as a means to
preserve low- and moderate-income housing by seizing marginal properties
prior to their severe deterioration.2 Although Local Law #45 was not in-
tended to make the City into a landlord of last resort for low-income ten-
ants, it had that effect.26
The City also took steps to revamp the administration of housing serv-
ices. In 1976, the Council established the Department of Housing Preser-
vation and Development (HPD) to replace the Housing Development
Administration (HDA) as the City's housing arm.27 Wo years later, the
Council transferred jurisdiction for the daily management, maintenance,
repair, treatment and disposition of all residential City-owned properties
from the Department of General Services to HPD's Office of Property
Management (OPM).28
Abandonment remained a problem throughout most of the 1980's, un-
til 1988, when the. strengthening economy increased housing demand and
slowed the rate of abandonment.29 However, abandonment remains a
chronic problem in New York City. Between 1990 and 1991, tax delinquen-
cies of Bronx walk-ups increased by 44 percent, and of Manhattan walk-ups
by 32 percent.30 A recent study of housing disinvestment in New York City
found that many poor neighborhoods continued to have a substantial risk
of mass abandonment.' The report concluded that "[e]ighteen of the city's
59 community districts face high risks, [in] either a combination of high tax
arrears and mortgage foreclosures or an unusually high rate of tax arrears,"
with the South Bronx, Harlem, and East Brooklyn-already damaged by
24. THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, In Rem Housing Program, First Annual Report, at iii (1979) [hereinafter FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT].
25. STEGMAN, supra note 19, at 207.
26. See generally Carol Felstein & Michael A. Stegman, Toward the 21st Century:
Housing in New York City (May 1987) (unpublished report prepared for the Commission
on the Year 2000, on file with author).
27. Luis Sierra, The Contribution of New York City's Task Forces and Working Groups
to City-Owned Housing Policy, 1978 to the Present, in HOUSING IN THE BALANCE: SEEKING
A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY FOR CITY-OWNED HOUSING 7 (Michele Cotton ed., 1993).
HDA had been created in 1967 as a super-agency to deal with New York City's housing.
28. Id.
29. Anthony DePalna, Pace of Building Abandonment Tumbles, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
1988, § 10, at 1.
30. See PRESERVING, supra note 13, at 8 (citing NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NEw YORK CITY REAL PROPERTY TAX, FISCAL YEAR
1992). At the end of fiscal 1991, 14,634 walk-up apartment buildings were in arrears. Id.
While the number of walk-up buildings in arrears has not changed significantly during the
past several years (prior to the issuance of this report), the average amount of those arrears
has increased from $1,922 to $3,034. Id.
31. VICTOR BACH & SHERECE Y. WEST, COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NaW
YORK, HOUSING ON THE BLOCK: DISINVESTMENT AND ABANDONMENT RISKS IN NEw
YoRK CITY NEIGHBORHOODS 28 (1993).
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earlier waves of abandonment-most at risk.32 A 1992 report noted that in
the twenty poorest community districts nearly one out of every seven units
of privately owned rent-regulated housing was in immediate jeopardy of
lapsing into abandonment.3 Abandonment has worsened in recent years.
Each year, the City loses about 15,000 units to abandonment, fire, and ag-
ing while gaining about 5,000 new households.34
C. Vesting
Vesting, the acquisition of properties by the government through legal
action for non-payment of property taxes, has become a focal point for the
debate regarding the fate of the private sector housing market.3 s Vesting
highlights the private, for-profit sector's failure to provide adequate hous-
ing for low-income tenants. As such, it is the first point in the process of
abandonment at which commentators may ask: is the for-profit private sec-
tor the best landlord for low-income households?
Tax delinquent housing does not automatically belong to the munici-
pality. Rather, the city must choose to take ownership of it. The city may
choose to vest tax-delinquent property in order to maintain a credible
threat to landlords who find it convenient to be delinquent.36 It may also
choose to vest delinquent property to protect the health and safety of ten-
ants in abandoned buildings. Timely vesting also allows the city to take
32. Id. at 8.
33. PRESERVING, supra note 13, at 1 (finding that of 350,000 units in those districts,
50,000 were in immediate jeopardy of abandonment).
34. Philip Lentz, City Preparing Zoning Changes to Lift Buildings: Housing Urgency
Prompts Proposals Aimed at Relaxing Curbs on Developers, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUsINESS, Nov.
11, 1996, at 1.
35. Stegman, supra note 19, at 207. Prior to vesting, the City typically sends a number
of warnings to landlords who are delinquent in their tax payments. The City also makes
available several opportunities to reclaim their buildings before final vesting. The City has
installment agreements for owners (10 percent down; payment over 12 years). In the past,
the City had allowed, although only with Board of Estimate approval, owners to redeem
buildings up to four months after final vesting. From 1978 to September 1982, the owners of
21,311 buildings had entered into installment agreements and only 2.7 percent had their
buildings repossessed. Ronald Smothers, New Law Reduces Brooklyn Tax Foreclosures,
N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 12, 1982, § 8, at 7.
Later, the redemption policy became more generous. In 1986, the City allowed owners
two years to reclaim title from the City. In the first four months, owners could have
'mandatory redemption' if they paid their arrearage or made a long-term payment agree-
ment. After that initial period, redemptions could only occur at the City's discretion. Philip
S. Gutis, City To Seize 7,500 Occupied Apartments in Brooklyn, N.Y. TiMEtS, Apr. 13, 1986,
§ 8, at 7.
In the 1990s, the City stopped vesting. The City does, however, file a notice to fore-
close when a property is 12 months overdue if its annual tax bill is $2,750 or more. Shawn
G. Kennedy, New York City Stops Foreclosing On Tax-Delinquent Buildings, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1995, at B1.
For a history of early vesting legislation, see Nancy A. Brownstein, The Warranty of
Habitability as Applied to New York City In Rem Housing, 50 BROOK. L REv. 1103, 1105-
06 (1989).
36. See Smothers, supra note 35, at 7.
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control of buildings earlier in the abandonment cycle, therefore saving on
repair costs and assist tenants earlier.37 Too liberal a vesting policy, how-
ever, increases the pressure on the city to efficiently and effectively manage
vested properties. As a result of these pressures, very few municipalities
choose to vest tax-foreclosed housing, preferring instead to auction it off.38
New York City's policy toward vesting has changed over time as it
balances these competing needs. In the late 1970s, the City began to
reevaluate its policy of auctioning off in rem housing to the highest bidder.
The City discovered that such auctions were not generating any net reve-
nues as purchasers failed to pay taxes or repay City-provided mortgages.39
The City halted auctions in 1978.40 The next year, HPD vested about
14,000 buildings.4 This sudden increase in the in rem stock caused "a great
fear" that the decline of privately owned housing would cause New York
City, emerging from a debilitating fiscal crisis, to again be "plunged into
ruin," this time by the demands of a collapsing rental market.42 As the
managerial demands on HPD became overwhelming, it became HPD pol-
icy to avoid increasing its stock of vested units.43 Willingly or not, however,
HPD continued to receive more in rem properties: in some years in the
1970s and early 1980s, the City was vesting 10,000 to 30,000 units at a
time.44
Once it was clear the City would continue vesting abandoned prop-
erty, I-PD's policy shifted. Rather than trying to avoid vesting altogether,
it attempted to limit the rate of growth to one which the City could han-
dle.45 Though vesting remained irregular, the City had vested nearly 46,000
occupied units of in rem housing by 1984.46
37. Paul A. Crotty, New York City Has Been Making Major Strides as a Landlord, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1988, at A22.
38. See THE CITY OF NEW YORK, BREAKING THE In Rem Cycle: The Giuliani Adminis-
tration's Proposal to Reshape NYC's Property Tax Enforcement and Housing Preservation
Policies 5 (1995) (finding that only 3 of 26 responding cities own and manage occupied
properties) [hereinafter PRESERVATION POLICIES].
39. See FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 2 (reporting that an HPD study of
885 residential multiple dwellings sold at auction from January, 1976 through February, 1978
disclosed 90% were delinquent in either tax or purchase money mortgage payments, or
both, as of early 1979; of the delinquent properties, 43% had never made a single tax pay-
ment and 31% were already four or more quarters in arrears and eligible again for foreclo-
sure). See also Brownstein, supra note 35, at 1107.
40. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 3.
41. DePalna, supra note 29, at 1.
42. Felstein & Stegman, supra note 26, at 28.
43. Id. at 29.
44. Alan S. Oser, Taking Steps to Head Off Abandonment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,1992,
§ 10, at 5.
45. Alan S. Oser, Approach to Rehabilitation of West Harlem's Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1980, at A23.
46. Stegman, supra note 19, at 206.
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Commentators urged regular vesting as a way to avoid protracted
abandonment and the consequent hardship for tenants and on the build-
ings themselves n7 In 1984, New York City decided to vest annually in each
borough.48 This consistency increased tax collection rates, encouraged
owners to pay their taxes in order to redeem their buildings, and resulted in
the City garnering successively fewer buildings and lots.4 9
By 1992, HPD's annual vestings averaged about 5,200 units within 400
to 500 buildings and the rate of building intake was roughly equal to the
rate of disposition. This period of relative stability ended with the reces-
sion in the early 1990s. Defaults again began to rise, and buildings in seri-
ous tax arrears grew from 13,737 in 1989 to 18,003 in 1993.50 The City
responded to this increase by ceasing vesting altogether. It has not vested
any buildings since 1993.51
Though it ceased vesting in 1993, the City had already taken owner-
ship of an immense stock of housing and will continue to own it for the
foreseeable future. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the City's policy
towards the in rem properties for which it is currently responsible.
D. The DAMP Programs
When K-PD became responsible for in rem properties in 1978, its
newly established Office of Property Management became, in effect, the
new landlord for in rem tenants.51 As such, OPM has been responsible for
management, repair and renovation of City-owned housing, as well as for
finding emergency housing for displaced tenants.53 This office is also re-
sponsible for developing and operating programs to return these properties
to private ownership.
KPD's First Annual Report in 1979 summed up OPM's first year's
accomplishments:
" developed a maintenance delivery system
" developed a comprehensive program for long term treatment
and disposition
* surveyed and categorized its holdings
47. Felstein & Stegman, supra note 26, at 36; Andrew Scherer, Is There Life After
Abandonment? The Key Role of New York City's In Rem Housing in Establishing an Enti-
tlement to Decen4 Affordable Housing, 13 N.Y.U REV. L & Soc. CHANcE 953, 962 (1984).
48. Stegman, supra note 19, at 207.
49. See DePalma, supra note 1, at 1.
50. Shawn G. Kennedy, Defaults Rise, Posing Peril for Housing, N.Y. Tzmis, May 31,
1994, at B1.
51. Kennedy, supra note 35, at B1. The City has, however, sold some tax liens to a
private investment trust. Alan S. Oser, New York City Shifts Tactics on Troubled Housing,
N.Y. Trms, June 16, 1996, §9, at 1; see also, Oser, supra note 2, at 7.
52. Crr oF NEw YORK, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF THE REPORT ISSUED BY THE MAYOR'S PRIVATE SEcrOR
SURVEY 2-3 (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter SUPPORT].
53. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 2.
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" created decentralized local offices
o hired real estate managers
" developed alternative management and sales programs
o developed a program to move tenants to refurbished
apartments.54
-PD acknowledged that the creation of OPM signalled a move away
from a rapid disposition strategy:
The establishment of the Office of Property Management within
HPD signified this Administration's change in attitude towards
the treatment of the City's owner-abandoned housing stock. It
represented a recognition that the City's long term housing objec-
tives could only be served by a planned treatment and disposition
program which took into account local neighborhood develop-
ment efforts and the existence of other complementary housing
programs and initiatives in developing comprehensive treatment
and disposition strategies.
At the same time that it was rehabilitating in rem housing, HPD
wanted to continue disposing of it. The Division of Alternative Manage-
ment Programs (DAMP) was created in 1978 to fill that need. DAMP was
designed to dispose of in rem buildings to community organizations, tenant
associations, individuals, private real estate firms, and the NYC Housing
Authority. Its stated goal was to select managers and owners who could
operate these buildings responsibly.
56
At its conception, DAMP consisted of only two programs: the Com-
munity Management Program (CMP), in existence since 1972, and the
newly created Tenant Interim Lease Program (TIL). At that time, these
two programs were responsible for 85 buildings with 1700 units.5 7 Within a
year, four new programs were added and 413 buildings with 8,200 units
were turned over to DAMP.5 8
HPD identified its goals for DAMP programs as the following:
o providing decent and adequate housing to tenants in City-
Owned buildings
o training, supervising, and testing private organizations in hous-
ing management and maintenance to assure that they are quali-
fied to manage and subsequently purchase City-owned property
o conveying properties-stabilized and upgraded through a pe-
riod of responsible management-to private groups
54. Id. at 3-4.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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* returning in rem properties to the City's tax rolls.5 9
DAMP attempted to develop creative solutions to the problem of dis-
posing in rem units. Each DAIVIP program relied on a different type of
housing manager, hoping to maximize the number of organizations that
could take responsibility for some portion of New York City's low-income
housing stock.
The oldest program, CMP, was designed to actively involve tenants
and community members in the maintenance and day-to-day management
of buildings in deteriorating neighborhoods. CMP contracted with locally-
based non-profit community organizations, placing each organization in
control of managing and upgrading 100 to 350 units of City-owned housing
in 1978.60
Under TIL, organized tenant groups living in City-owned buildings
could sign an 11-month, renewable lease with HPD which allowed them to
manage and maintain their buildings from the proceeds of the rent rolls.
This program was designed to "promote and develop self-management
skills among tenants.' Unlike the other programs established in the
1970's and 1980's, this program is still in operation today.
DAMP's new programs targeted other types of housing providers.
The 7A Extension Program provided "court appointed administrators
managing privately-owned buildings with a legal basis for continuing to
manage their properties after they become City-owned."62 Under the
Management in Partnership Program (MIPP), I-IPD contracted with estab-
lished "housing management organizations (the Senior Partners) to pro-
vide four inexperienced community based groups (the Junior Partners)
with the training necessary to make them successful housing managers."'
The HPD-NYC Housing Authority program (HPD-NYCHA) was in-
tended not only to improve the in rem stock, but also "to protect the invest-
ment of the Federal Government" in neighborhoods in which public
59. Id.
60. Id. at 31. CMP, like POMP, faced public criticism. See, e.g., Jacqueline Rivkin,
Tenants Fault Equity Program on Maintenance, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 2, 1990, at 21. It was
slated for discontinuation in 1995. See Ann Henderson, Low Income Tenant Cooperatives:
Can They Survive?, in HOUSING IN THE BALANCE SEEKING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY FOR
Crr-OwNED HOUSING 66 (Michele Cotton ed., 1993).
61. Firsr ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 34.
62. Id. at 36. See also Lisa W. Foderaro, City's 7-A Administrators Help Neglected
Buildings, N.Y. Tms, Jan. 12, 1986, § 8, at 7.
63. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 37. See also Alan S. Oser, Management
of City-Held Properties, N.Y. TiiEs, Nov. 27, 1981, at B27 (describing one senior partner's
experience in running a community-based management group). The City tried another for-
profit/not-for-profit partnership later in the 1980s, the Neighborhood Ownership Works
(NOW) program. See Penny Loeb, City Tops Slumlord Business: Study Shows Worst Hous-
ing Operated by Government Agency, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 3, 1993, at 6. NOW was soon
terminated. TASK FORCE ON CITY-OWNED PROPERTY, THE In Rein Organizer's
Sourcebook 7 (Michele Cotton ed., 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter In Rem Organizer's
Sourcebook].
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housing was located.' a This program had two components. In the first, the
Housing Authority Management Program (HAMP), HPD contracted with
the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) for management and
moderate rehabilitation of occupied City-owned buildings neighboring
NYCHA projects. In the second component, the Housing Authority Reha-
bilitation Program (HARP), NYCHA rehabilitated substantially vacant
City-owned buildings near public housing projects and took ownership of
them.
65
The final program, the Private Ownership and Management Program
(POMP), sold buildings to for-profit landlords. This program is described
in detail below.
In all of these programs, the City intended for the alternative manag-
ers to have wide latitude in day-to-day management of the buildings under
their control. DAMP reserved for itself the ultimate responsibility of moni-
toring performance. To this end, DAMP established three oversight units:
Fiscal, Technical Services and Rent Restructuring.
66
The City also directly managed a substantial amount of the in rem
stock through OPM's Division of Property Management.67 No one, includ-
ing senior HPD officials, has characterized HPD as an effective manager of
housing. While some have criticized HPD as the worst possible landlord,68
others have noted that it is sometimes better than private sector
providers.6 9
II.
THE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(POMP)
Under POMP, the City sold in rem buildings to for-profit landlords.
The City abandoned this program during the Dinkins administration due to
repeated outcry by tenants and their advocates, negative findings by the
Comptroller's Office, and extensive litigation. Despite the failure of
POMP, the Giuliani administration recently revived sales to for-profit land-
lords under a new program, the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program
(NEP). An examination of POMP provides some evidence of how NEP is
likely to fare.
64. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 41.
65. Id.
66. ld. at 43.
67. DePalma, supra note 1, at 1.
68. Id at 1; PETER D. SALINS, SCARCITY By DESIGN 127 (1992); Loeb, supra note 63,
at 6.
69. See e.g., Harry DeRienzo, Conclusion, in HOUSING IN THE BALANCE: SEEKING A
COMPREHENSIVE POLICY FOR CIrY-OwNED HOUSING 74, 87-88 (Michele Cotton ed., 1993).
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A. The Origins of POMP
In 1979, New York City was spending over $50 million per year to
maintain 33,000 in rem units. HPD contacted some of the City's larger real
estate management firms to determine if they would be willing to manage
the City's stock on a 'pro bono' basis. After the firms declined to partici-
pate in this initiative, H{PD contacted smaller firms with experience manag-
ing fifty- to seventy-five-year-old properties in low-income areas. Some of
these firms expressed an interest in managing and buying in rem units. 70
HPD inaugurated POMP to take advantage of this private sector inter-
est. According to Mayor Koch, POMP was
designed to encourage not only good management of City-owned
properties, but also their eventual return to the tax roll. We need
the experience and commitment of the responsible private real-
estate sector to get these buildings into decent shape after years of
neglect by their former owners and to ensure that proper, efficient
management will be the rule during the contract and after sale.71
Through POMP, the City turned over in rem buildings to for-profit manag-
ers who would oversee City-funded rehabilitation and, in time, take owner-
ship of them. POMP's mission expanded to ensure that the buildings
remained as low- and moderate-income rentals and to make more housing
available to homeless families.72
To find stable real estate firms that were managing at least 100 units,
H-PD advertised in newspapers. These firms were required to submit a Re-
quest for Qualifications (RFQ) outlining their staffing, experience, and the
histories of the buildings they managed or owned 3 The POMP staff con-
firmed the information on the RFQ, made unannounced visits to a sample
of the properties managed by the firm, and checked to ensure that the
POMP applicant had never owned a building taken by the City for tax
arrears.7 4 The RFQ and the results of the inspections then went to an HPD
committee, which made the final selection of firms to be awarded POMP
contracts. 75
70. Diane Adler, HPD's Private Ownership And Management Program, N.Y. AFFAIRS,
Fall 1986, at 117, 118-19.
71. Id. at 117.
72. Crr OF NEw YORK, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, AuDIT REPORT ON THE NEw
YORK C=TY DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT'S PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ME 89-106, at 1 (Apr. 26, 1991) (report pre-
pared by the Bureau of the Audit, on file with author) [hereinafter AuDrr].
73. l& at 1.
74. Crn OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEvELop.
MENT, In Rein Housing Program, Second Annual Report 12 (1980) [hereinafter SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT].
75. AuDrr, supra note 72, at 2. The committee looked for firms that possessed the
following characteristics: experience in the management of older, multi-family residential
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After receiving approval from the HPD committee, the firm could
choose buildings from the POMP-eligible building list. POMP-eligible
buildings were lower risks than most of the other occupied buildings in the
City's hands: they had high actual or potential occupancy rates, they were
located on blocks where abandonment had not yet become widespread,
and they were in relatively good condition. To be designated a POMP
building, BPD also had to determine that its inclusion in POMP would
contribute to the stabilization of the neighborhood.76 Finally, HPD re-
quired that the firm choose buildings close to those that it already owned.77
HPD distributed flyers throughout each POMP-eligible building, alerting
tenants that their building was being considered for placement in the
program.78
Once the firm selected a building, the building's tenants were notified
and met with POMP officials, who introduced the private contractor and
presented the proposed rehabilitation and repair plan.79 At the same time,
POMP staff would obtain a list of the building's outstanding 'hazardous'
and 'immediately hazardous' housing code violations from HPD's Division
of Code Enforcement. The POMP staff and the POMP contractor con-
ducted independent inspections of the building before negotiating a one-
year repair plan and budget. The plan and budget were fashioned into a
two-stage contract that would then be submitted for approval.80
In the first stage of the process, the City executed a one-year manage-
ment contract with the firm. The firm received a fee to manage the prop-
erty and supervise City-funded building renovations. The goal of this one-
year, subsidized management contract was to ready the building for sale to
the firm. The City provided funding for major repairs and to cover any
negative cash flow in the first six months of operation.8 ' Although POMP
began with low subsidy levels, the funding for rehabilitations increased dra-
matically over the years, from $500-$1000 per unit in 1979 to as much as
$15,000 per unit in 1991.82
buildings; experience in the neighborhoods in with a number of City-owned properties ap-
propriate for POMP; ability to foster a co-operative relationship with tenants; technical abil-
ity to identify and correct structural problems; and administrative expertise in management,
repair, personnel and record-keeping activities. Community Service Society of New York,
The Alternative Management Programs: A Housing Resource Guide (Feb. 1980) (un-
paginated guide, on file with author) [hereinafter Alternative Management Programs].





81. Alternative Management Programs, supra note 75.
82. When POMP began, HPD provided $500-1,000 per unit for rehabilitation. Beverly
Cheuvront, POMP's Broken Promises, CITY LIMITS, Aug.-Sept. 1988, at 12, 13. In its sec-
ond year, POMP provided rehabilitation funds of $570-2,468 per unit. SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 74, at 12. By 1986, approximately $4,000 per unit was available. Adler,
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In order to monitor POMP firms, HPD required that they complete
Monthly Management Reports (MMR) and Contracting Agency Monthly
Fiscal (CAMF) reports.83 The MMR indicated the number of apartments
rented, the number under repair, and the number vacant. The MMR also
reported, by apartment, any legal proceedings against tenants.84 The
CAME listed the total repair payments for each building and showed the
balance of the monies allotted by HPD to the firm under the contract.8s
To attract for-profit landlords, rental rates had to exceed the cost of
running the building. Prior to being sold, City-owned buildings were ex-
empted from rent control or rent stabilization laws, and rents in occupied
apartments were generally "restructured" (raised) to market levels.8
Rents in vacant apartments were lifted to near market rent.8 To offset the
effects of these restructured rents, the City set aside about 30% of the va-
cant units for homeless families and placed an income cap on new tenants
so that the housing was available only to moderate- and low-income
families.8s
Near the expected sale date, POMP staff determined whether the rent
roll was sufficient to cover the monthly operating costs of the building.89
HIPD staff also inspected the apartments to determine whether the POMP
contractor had corrected the hazardous and immediately hazardous viola-
tions that were outstanding at the beginning of the contractf 0
After the first year, the City sold buildings to those firms whose per-
formance had satisfied HPD.91 The POMP contractors who bought the
supra note 70, at 122. By 1989, the City provided between $5,000-12,000 per unit for reha-
bilitation. Citizen's Housing and Planning Council, Housing Network 26 (undated newslet-
ter, on file with author). See also, Barry Meier, City on the Brink. Housing Hope for
Harried Tenants, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 24, 1989, at 6 (reporting that a POMP landlord re-
ceived $11,700 per unit for rehabilitation); Barry Meier, POMP and Circunstances: City
Effort Gets Mixed Evaluation, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 24, 1989, at 6 (reporting that landlords
received as much as $15,000 per unit for rehabilitation). While these numbers are not ad-
justed for inflation, they do indicate a real increase in funding.
83. AuDrr, supra note 72, at 2.
84. Id. These included notices of eviction sent, warrants, evictions, or settlements.
85. Id.
86. Cheuvront, supra note 82, at 15-16. The authority to remove rent protections is
found in the N.Y.C. ADum,. CODE, §§ Y51-3.0[e][2][J; YY51-3.0[a][1][a]. Although H-PD
maintained that no one was to be evicted because of inability to afford the rent, it is undocu-
mented whether this policy was enforced and whether its compliance was monitored.
87. Some commentators noted that such a policy may create an incentive to evict ten-
ants during the first stage of the contract in order to replace them with tenants who could
afford higher rents. Cheuvront, supra note 82, at 13. See also Hovde, supra note 4, at 51.
88. Alternative Management Programs, supra note 75.
89. AuDrr, supra note 72, at 2.
90. Id.
91. HPD kept broad discretion as to what was 'satisfactory.' The POMP guidelines
noted only that "HPD may terminate the POMP lease, the POMP contract and any partici-
pation by the POMP contractor in POMP if HPD determines that the POMP contractor's
performance has been unsatisfactory." City of New York Department of Housing Preserva-
tion and Development, Proposed POMP Regulations, § 404 (a) (undated guidelines, on file
with author).
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City's buildings entered the second stage of the contract. Buildings were
generally sold for $2,500 per unit.92 HPD stopped monitoring the building
at this point,93 although it required that the firm obtain HPD's written ap-
proval before it could sell, refinance, transfer, exchange, assign or lease all
or substantially all of its interest in the building for the first ten years of the
mortgage.94 In addition, BPD forbade firms from converting POMP build-
ings to cooperatives or condominiums for fifteen years after the sale unless
the firm first secured BPD approval.95
After the building was sold to the private firm, rents were once more
controlled or stabilized.96 State or federal subsidies were generally pro-
vided to eligible in-place tenants who could afford the new rents, although
these subsidies were not available for all POMP tenants.97
B. The Growth of POMP
The number of units placed in POMP and the number of firms that
became POMP contractors increased dramatically over time. While the
size of individual contracts also increased, HPD maintained a low ratio of
staff to units in POMP. 98 Unfortunately, data about POMP's growth was
not consistently collected. HPD published annual reports only during the
first seven years of POMP's existence. After the last annual report in 1986,
sources of data were scattered and the types of data collected changed.
In 1979, POMP's first year, HPD expected that the typical contract
would be for 100-150 units to be managed and upgraded by an established
management firm for which 200-300 units of City-owned housing would not
represent more than one-third of its total workload.99 In reality, POMP
contracted with two private firms to manage more than a total of 800 units
92. Audit, supra note 72, at 2. Prices were sometimes lower than $2,500 per unit. In
one case, a landlord bought a building for $1,800 per unit. Rita Giordano, Housing Pro-
grams under Tenant Fire, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 28, 1991, at 3.
93. In response to a critical audit conducted by the Office of the Comptroller, HPD
required owners of former POMP buildings to correct any serious violations. HPD also
began to make field visits to all former POMP buildings to assess the conditions of the
properties. AUDIT, supra note 72, at 4, 9. However, POMP was defunded soon after these
changes were made. See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
94. AUDIT, supra note 72, at 2. This was the policy at the time that POMP ended. The
previous sales policy, in effect from 1981 through 1986, had a five year bar on resale. This
led to some quick profits from resale for at least one POMP firm. See Cheuvront, supra
note 82, at 16.
95. AUDIT, supra note 72, at 3.
96. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ Y 51-5.0(a)(7); YY 513.3.
97. AUDIT, supra note 72, at 2.
98. HPD staffed POMP leanly. At the end of Fiscal Year 1985, it had approximately
471 dwelling units per POMP coordinator. In 1991, it had 621 units per POMP coordinator.
AUrrr, supra note 72, at addendum 6.
99. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 39.
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of City-owned housing in Manhattan and the Bronx.""0 These first con-
tracts stipulated that major repairs would take place within the first three
to six months. First round rent restructuring-rent increases-would take
place after four to six months. Final restructuring, known as "outtake"
rents, would be implemented in the month prior to sale.10'
During 1980, four POMP contracts were signed.10 These four firms,
as well as two others which were scheduled to begin their contracts during
1981, were selected from over 75 applications received since the program's
inception. Contracts from POMP's first year continued to be processed for
sale, indicating that HPD was satisfied with contractor performance. In its
Second Annual Report, HPD indicated that it believed POMP's primary
goal of stabilizing, rehabilitating, and disposing of City-owned properties to
responsible management firms within 12 months was being
accomplished. 1 3
By the end of its third year, POMP had handled a total of 58 buildings
with 1,902 units through contracts with five POMP firms.104 POMP also
completed its first sale, selling 9 buildings with 516 units for $390,000.105
This sale was completed without immediately displacing any tenants.106
During 1981, rents were restructured in 800 units, bringing the cumulative
POMP total to 1,215 restructured units.1°7 Other buildings were also pro-
ceeding through the sales pipeline on schedule.108
100. ML Stephen Leon, Inc., the first POMP contractor, assumed management of 492
units in Central Harlem and the Bronx on August 1, 1979. Tenants of a 52-unit City-owned
building, neighboring a building being managed by Stephen Leon through POMP, peti-
tioned the City to allow that firm to manage their building as well. This request was granted
on September 1. Lemle and Wolff, Inc., an established Washington Heights-based firm spe-
cializing in moderate rehabilitation, began management of 328 units in Washington Heights
on September 1. Id.
101. Id. at 39-40.
102. The contracts were with two firms that had contracts the year earlier and with two
new firms: Lemle and Wolff, Inc. contracted for ten buildings with 340 units; Stephen Leon,
Inc. contracted for nine buildings with 510 units; Tecra Management Company, Inc., a com-
pany with substantial minority ownership and experience managing HUD-sponsored reha-
bilitation projects, contracted for nine buildings with 235 units; and 1700 Development
Corp., which had experience working with 'troubled' properties, in the Bronx, contracted
for five buildings with 217 units. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 12.
103. Id. at 13.
104. NEw YORK Crry, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PLESERVATION AND DEVELOP.
Nm r, In Rem Housing Program, Third Annual Report 20 (1981) [hereinafter THiRD AN-
NuAL REPORT].
105. Id. at 21. Stephen Leon, Inc. was the buyer. At the time of the sale, the City
expected to receive $78,180 in tax payments annually. HPD calculated that the City would
recoup $1.8 million over the following fifteen years in tax and mortgage payments, repre-
senting a return on investment of 33%. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Lemle and Wolff were expected to purchase all 10 buildings with 340 units that
they had managed since September, 1979. By the end of FY 1982, 10 buildings with 257
units managed by Tecra, and three buildings with 159 units managed by 1700 Development
Corp. were to be sold as well. i
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By its fourth year, POMP had contracted with 8 firms and rehabili-
tated 72 buildings with 2,500 units. POMP had sold 16 of those buildings,
containing 825 units.10 9 It still remained a relatively modest DAMP pro-
gram, with the smallest number of buildings in its portfolio and with fewer
units than all DAMP programs except for the soon-to-be-defunct MIPP
program.110
In POMP's fifth year, sales continued to be strong, with 22 buildings
sold and another 33 buildings in advanced stages of the sales pipeline. At
the same time, POMP rent collection increased to 87%, a 10% improve-
ment over the prior year's figure."' Five firms were chosen for POMP
contracts that year.
1 2
In its sixth year, the federal Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (I{UD) presented POMP with an award for National Excellence,
the highest award presented in HUD's National Recognition Program for
Community Development Partnerships. 13  POMP's sales exceeded
$1,000,000 for the first time as 18 more buildings with 825 units were
sold." 4 Forty more buildings with 1,467 units were in the sales pipeline. 115
POMP sales were being made despite a legal challenge to DAMP's
rent restructuring procedures. In Laureano v. Koch, tenants in an in rem
building sought to review and annul rent increases ranging from 50 to 108
percent."16 The judge held for the tenants, determining that HPD's proce-
dures for determining rent increases for in rem tenants violated the state
constitution. Specifically, the decision held that raising rents without
promulgating guidelines, proper notice and adequate tenant consultation
was arbitrary, unreasonable, and administratively unlawful. The City re-
sponded by promulgating regulations pursuant to the City Charter, and the
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for mootness." 7 As a result of the
lawsuit, many expected sales were delayed.' 18
109. CITY OF NEW YORK, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOP.
MENT, In Rem Housing Program, Fourth Annual Report 8 (1982) [hereinafter FOURTH AN-
NUAL REPORT].
110. Id. at 37.
111. CITY OF NEw YORK, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, In Rem Housing Program, Fifth Annual Report 15-16 (1983) [hereinafter FilrrM AN.
NUAL REPORT]. Contrast this with the overall HPD rent collection rate: in 1989, HPD
collected about 64% of its rents in the month they were due. SUPPORT, supra note 52, at 7.
112. FiFm ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 111, at 16.
113. CITY OF NEW YORK, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, In Rem Housing Program, Sixth Annual Report 17 (1984) [hereinafter SIxTrfl AN.
NUAL REPORT].
114. Id. Total sales amounted to $1,041,000.
115. Id.
116. Laureano v. Koch, 454 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. 1982), rev'd, 473 N.Y.S.2d 445
(App. Div., 1st Dept. 1984), rev'd as moot, 479 N.E.2d 821 (1985). For further discussion on
Laureano, see supra notes 357-365 and accompanying text.
117. The court declared the issue moot because the City agreed to promulgate rules.
479 N.E.2d 821 (1985).
118. SixTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 31.
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In 1985, the program's seventh year, the rent collection rate was
92%. 119 Sales hit a new high of 31 buildings totalling 1,001 units, although
starts and completions of rehabilitations of units had begun to slow
down.
20
By the end of 1986, POMP had entered into 30 contracts with 23 man-
agement firms.121 In addition, a total of 100 buildings with 4,110 units had
been sold through POMP."z In its eighth year, the rent collection rate was
95%.123
Although it began as a small part of DAMP, involving no more than
4% of HPD's occupied units from 1980-1985,124 POMP continued to grow
in terms of its funding and the number of units placed within it. After
1985, POMP's budget grew dramatically in absolute terms as well as a per-
centage of the total DAMP budget. By 1989, the year in which additions to
POMP ended, POMP received nearly half of the total funds allocated to
DAMP. 2 Nonetheless, POMP sales never matched the expectations that
the program had engendered.
In 1988, the City was again sued, this time by an in rem tenants associ-
ation contending that HPD's failure to provide written guidelines for
POMP violated constitutional due process requirements. 1 6 The plaintiff
further claimed that the tenants had no voice in the disposition of their
buildings, and that POMP deprived them of affordable housing. The ten-
ants' attorney said that "at a minimum, tenants have to be provided with
adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard. We're asking the city to come
up with a process of notice." 127 The court agreed that the tenants were
entitled to due process and held that the City had violated the City Char-
ter's procedures for providing the public with notice and the opportunity to
be heard.'
POMP continued to face problems in implementation. The City's
Board of Estimate, responsible for approving the contracts between the
City and private POMP firms, was dissolved as a result of a 1989 United
States Supreme Court decision.129 New procedures for the sale of POMP
119. CrY OF NEw YORK, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOP-
mENT, In Rem Housing Program, ANNUAL REPORT 17 [hereinafter 85186 ANNUAL REPORT].
120. Id. at 47-48.
121. Id. at 17.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Citizen's Housing and Planning Council, The Housing Network, Part 11: Recom-
mendations for Improving HPD's Production and Preservation Programs 26 (undated re-
port, on file with author) [hereinafter Network, Part II].
125. Meier, Mixed Evaluation, supra note 82, at 6.
126. Union of City Tenants v. Koch, 574 N.Y.S.2d 695 (App. Dic., 1st Dep't 1991). See
Larry Bivins, Tenants File Suit, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 11, 1988, at 33.
127. Jessie Mangaliman, Tenants Get Sale of 2 Buildings Delay, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 2,
1988, at 33. See also, Bivens, supra note 126, at 33.
128. Union of City Tenants, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
129. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
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building became necessary as the responsibility of approving sales fell on
the City Council and the Mayor's Office. The next year, the City's Law
Department required I-PD to completely redraft POMP sales documents.
These two changes slowed down sales.130
By January, 1991, POMP had sold a total of 230 buildings with 8,393
units.' 3' The program had another 4,350 under management. 132 It had con-
tracts in all five boroughs, but POMP was soon to close its doors.
C. The End of Pomp
By the beginning of 1991, public criticism of POMP had eclipsed en-
thusiasm for the program. POMP was criticized when HPD placed 9 build-
ings that were sold through POMP under the control of a 7-A
Administrator because the landlord had maintained them in extremely
poor condition.133 A 7-A Administrator is appointed by a court to manage
a building if the owner has failed to manage it properly. This is an extreme
measure and is generally taken only if the conditions in the building are
dismal.134 Nevertheless, Joan Wallstein, the Assistant Commissioner in
charge of DAMP, defended the program, claiming that "every in rem build-
ing is a potential candidate for POMP. ' '1
35
In April 1991, the City's Office of the Comptroller released the find-
ings of a nearly two-year investigation of POMP. 1 36 The purpose of the
audit was to review the policies and procedures that HPD itself used to
measure the performance of POMP. 137 In other words, the audit sought to
evaluate POMP on its own terms. The auditors also reviewed community
concerns about excessive evictions in POMP buildings. The audit covered
the period December 1979 through October 1990, reviewing nearly the en-
tire period during which POMP existed.138
The media highlighted the most disturbing finding of the audit: de-
spite the fact that many POMP landlords had failed to correct dangerous
130. OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF NEW YORK, PRELIMINARY MAYOR'S MANAOE-
MENT REPORT 282 (January 30, 1991).
131. Rita Giordano, Housing Program under Tenant Fire, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 28,
1991, at 3.
132. Id. The Office of the Comptroller had a different set of figures. It found that 200
buildings with 7,558 apartments had been renovated and sold through POMP. AUDIT,
supra note 72, at 3.
133. Giordano, supra note 131, at 8.
134. See generally VIcKa OPPENHEIM, AN EXAMINATION OF THE 7-A PROGRAM (Feb-
ruary 1993) (report prepared for the Community Service Society, on file with author).
135. Giordano, supra note 131, at 3.
136. AUTrr, supra note 72.
137. Id. at 1.
138. Id.
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building code violations in buildings bought through POMP, the City con-
tinued to award POMP contracts to the delinquent landlords. 39 Commu-
nity concern over evictions from POMP buildings was also prevalent.
Mayor Dinkins ended POMP in May, 1991 and HPD announced that
POMP's funding would be cut from the budget.14° Although buildings in
the pipeline could complete the process, there were delays in the comple-
tion of the rehabilitation of several POMP buildings due to structural and
other unforeseen physical problems that were discovered after rehabilita-
tion had begun.141
Neither the City nor the advocacy community was completely happy
with this result because the underlying problem with in rem housing re-
mained: people continued to live in substandard housing. Moreover, the
City proposed no significant management model to replace POMP.142
D. Evaluating POMP
There have been four comprehensive studies of POMP. The New
York City Office of the Comptroller conducted the aforementioned audit,
evaluating POMP's compliance with its own procedures and performance
goals. 43 The Mayor's Private Sector Survey was conducted by the busi-
ness-centered advocacy community and evaluated POMP's efficiency.
144
For the tenant-centered advocacy community, the Task Force on City-
Owned Housing conducted two separate surveys that evaluated in rem ten-
ants' evaluation of their housing.145 Before reviewing these four compre-
hensive studies, we will first consider City officials' own assessments of
POMP.
1. City Officials' Self-Assessment
There appears to be very little unadulterated praise of POMP. Diane
Adler, a former POMP coordinator, characterized POMP's first years as
139. See eg., Manuel Perez-Rivas, Audit Says City Rewards Lax Landlords, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Apr. 29, 1991, at 21.
140. Rita Giordano, Mixed News for Housing Advocates, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 18,
1991, at 11; Chris Yurko & Anne Sanger, POMP Killed, CnTr LiMrrs, Aug.-Sept. 1991, at 5.
141. OFMCE OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF NEW YORK, MAYOR'S MANAG4ENr REPORT
201 (September 17, 1993).
142. Giordano, supra note 140, at 11.
143. AuDIT, supra note 72, at 1.
144. Barbara M. Tillman, Irving H. Kaplan, Rosemarie A. Sabatino, & William J.
Voelker, Housing, Preservation and Development, in Crry OF NEW YORK, THE MAYOR'S
PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY- THE NEW YORK CITY SERVICE CRISis, A MANAOF EMN RE-
SPONSE 57 (1989) [hereinafter PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY]
145. Susan Saegert, Survey of Residents of Currently and Previously City-Owned Build-
ings in the Bronx, in HOUSING IN THE BALANCE: SEEINIJG A COMPREHENSIVE POLIcY FOR
Crr-OwNED HOUsING 17 (Michele Cotton ed., 1993) [hereinafter The Bronx Survey];
Housing Environments Research Group and The Task Force on City-Owned Property, The
Brooklyn Survey 14 (draft manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter, The Brooklyn
Survey].
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achieving mixed results, with 2 of the first 5 private contracts qualifying as
'successful."1 46 One contract in particular was considered very successful,
as tenants in a nearby in rem building asked the POMP contractor to man-
age their building as well. As a result of his role in POMP, this POMP
contractor was named one of the City's best landlords by The Daily News
in 1982.147
Adler argued that POMP, by minimizing red tape and relying on capa-
ble real estate firms which eagerly participated in the program, was a cost-
effective and time-efficient program for the management, rehabilitation,
and disposition of City-owned housing.148 POMP's per unit allocation of
rehabilitation funds was-at least at that time-substantially less than any
other DAMP program and buildings were generally sold within sixteen
months of signing the contract. 49 Adler stated that the operation and
management costs of the POMP buildings were approximately two-thirds
the cost of maintaining them by HPD. Other benefits included tax and
mortgage payments to the City on these buildings.150 She also noted, anec-
dotally, that tenants responded well to POMP landlords, offering as evi-
dence a case where rent collection went from 36% to 80% during the first
month of private ownership.15'
Other City officials also emphasized the successful elements of POMP.
In 1988, Mayor Koch stated that POMP managers "collect rents more effi-
ciently than we do, and they manage repairs a lot better than we do.' ' 152 At
the same time, Assistant Commissioner Wallstein stated that all POMP
managers were current in their real estate taxes and mortgage payments.
She felt that the "key to the success of the whole thing.. .[is] the quality of
the selection process for the landlords.' 53 Walistein later claimed, albeit
without citing support, that evictions in POMP were low and the quality of
the work was high.' 54 Kevin Alter, the director of OPM, found that the
"the best thing we do is choose our firms. We want a long-term relation-
ship with the management companies." Alter also noted that POMP had a
146. Adler, supra note 70, at 119-20.
147. Id. at 120
148. Id. at 122.
149. POMP's rehabilitation monies increased dramatically after Adler wrote this arti-
cle. See supra note 82. Remember also that POMP's selection criteria favored buildings
that were in relatively good repair and in better neighborhoods. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
150. Adler, supra note 70, at 122.
151. Id at 123.
152. William Murphy, Reluctant Landlord Wants Out: City Sees Answer in Private Man-
agers, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1988, at 9.
153. Id.
154. Rita Giordano, Housing Program Defended, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 1991, at 8.
But see AUDIT, supra note 72, at 17-18 (finding that POMP had a high eviction rate).
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detailed monitoring system in place that included regular reports of evic-
tions, incoming tenants, and repairs. 55 Yet, at least one former HPD offi-
cial, Joseph Shuldiner, sounded a word of warning regarding the sale of
tax-foreclosed buildings to for-profit owners: "[T]he reason why we have
so many of these abandoned buildings is that their brethren landlords al-
lowed them to run into the ground. So if you sell them privately, how do
you make sure that you sell them to good guys and not bad guys?"'156
2. Office of the Comptroller Audit
Keeping these public statement by City officials in mind, we can now
turn to the various external studies of POMP. Of these, perhaps the most
comprehensive was the review of POMP conducted by the Office of the
Comptroller. The audit identified POMP's primary goals as the sale of
City-owned buildings as low- and moderate-income rentals and the re-
housing of homeless families.157 Taking these goals as broad guidelines,
auditors looked for indicators that would identify whether POMP was
achieving these goals."58
Reviewing HPD's Division of Code Enforcement records, auditors
found that HPD consistently entered into new contracts with firms that had
serious, uncorrected Code violations issued on buildings that had been
purchased through POMP. 159 Six of the nine firms reviewed were awarded
POMP contracts subsequent to the purchase of POMP buildings that audi-
tors found to be in gross violation of the Housing Code. The auditors
noted that although POMP coordinators did visit former POMP buildings,
155. Cheuvront, supra note 82, at 13. For criticisms of POMP's monitoring system, see
notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
156. Giordano, supra note 131, at 3.
157. AuDrr, supra note 72, at 1.
158. Auditors considered the following: whether POMP contractors had corrected code
enforcement violations placed on buildings purchased through POMP; whether homeless
families were placed within POMP buildings; whether POMP staff members visited build-
ings on a regular basis to check the progress, quality and cost effectiveness of repairs and the
quality of management; whether POMP buildings returned to the tax rolls; and whether
there were excessive evictions from POMP buildings. Id. at ES-2 to ES-4.
159. Id. at 6. Auditors selected a sample of 36 of 133 buildings with 1,004 units sold to
nine contractors through POMP as of December, 1988. One of the 36 buildings was sold
and excluded from the audit. 30 of the 35 remaining buildings had a total of 959 Code
Enforcement violations. 102 (11%) of the violations were 'immediately hazardous'; 627
(65%) were 'hazardous'; and 230 (24%) were 'nonhazardous.' All of the contractors had
buildings with hazardous violations and nearly all of the buildings had immediately hazard-
ous violations. Some of the violations were outstanding for over four years. One firm
owned a building with 196 violations. That firm was subsequently awarded a POMP con-
tract to manage an additional 17 buildings. Id. at 6-7. In response to these findings, HPD
noted that the 959 total violations represented less than one (0.96) violation per unit. HPD
also noted that four buildings contained 60% of all of the violations. -PD anticipated
POMP would soon have lower violation rates, since rehabilitation funding for POMP had
been recently increased. Id. at addendum 2.
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BPD did not require that POMP coordinators obtain a list of code enforce-
ment violations for the buildings visited. Nor did HPD require owners to
correct these violations before awarding them new POMP contracts.
160
One of POMP's explicit goals was to re-house homeless families. The
auditors found that homeless families were placed in 40% of the total
number of available units during the period of the study.161 This was sub-
stantially higher than the 30% goal that HPD had set for POMP.1 62 Until
July 1989, POMP did not have any criteria regarding the placement of
homeless families in POMP units.163 While this lack of criteria did not in-
terfere with the placement of homeless families in POMP, there was a great
deal of variation between buildings in achieving such placement. 164 The
auditors found that the absence of regulations resulted in a haphazard pro-
gram for homeless families.
The Audit criticized POMP's monitoring procedures. According to
POMP's policies and procedures, staff members were required to "visit
buildings on a regular basis to check progress, quality and cost effectiveness
of repairs and quality of management.' ' 165 Yet auditors found little docu-
mentation of such visits. 166 They found that this absence of an effective
review system interfered with their evaluation of the POMP staff's
effectiveness. 67
The auditors also evaluated the rate of return of in rem buildings to
the tax roll by selling them to for-profit owners through POMP.1 68 Audi-
tors found that all of the buildings had returned to the tax roll, and only a
160. Id. at 7. In its response to the audit, HPD noted that some of these violations
may have been tenant-caused, such as illegal window gates, double cylinder locks, fire es-
cape obstructions, etc. HPD deemed it nearly impossible to compel tenants to correct such
violations. In HPD's own analysis of the 35 buildings sampled, 119 (16%) of the hazardous
and immediately hazardous violations were tenant-caused. Id. at 8.
161. Id. at 10. These figures are consistent with those compiled by the Task Force
survey of tenants. The Bronx Survey, supra note 145, at 25.
162. Alternative Management Programs, supra note 75.
163. AUDIT, supra note 72, at 10. Auditors reviewed the records of 15 POMP buildings
with contract period started at some point between December 1986 and 1988. 210 apart-
ments became available in those 15 buildings during the various contract periods. The audi-
tors then compared these findings with the placement records of the Homeless Referral
Unit (HRU) for the same period. They found that POMP coordinators had referred 93
(44%) of the available apartments to HRU. Homeless families had been placed into 83 of
these apartments (40% of the total number of available apartments). Id.
164. In one building, 25 of 27 apartments had been referred by POMP coordinators to
HPD's Homeless Referral Unit, yet in three other buildings, only one of 18 apartments had
been referred. Id. at 11.
165. Id. at 14.
166. Id. Auditors reviewed the records of seven POMP coordinators responsible for 90
buildings. 52 buildings were without documented inspections. Auditors noted that the reg-
ulations did not mandate the frequency of visits. They also noted that when there was docu-
mentation, it was detailed and comprehensive. Id.
167. Id. As of September, 1990, POMP required that its coordinators complete a daily
route sheet in order to document all field visits. Id. at 15.
168. Id. at 16. Auditors reviewed the Department of Finance's records for 133 build-
ings sold to twenty-one private owners through POMP as of December 1988. Id.
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handful were in real estate tax arrears of one year or more. None of the
owners of those buildings in arrears for a year or more had a current
POMP contract at the time of the audit. 169 The auditors found this to be
clear evidence that POMP was an effective means of returning in rem
buildings to the tax roll.170
In its addendum to the audit, HPD emphasized the fact that no POMP
building has ever been re-vested by the City for tax delinquency.171 HPD
calculated that the total return to the City after the sale of POMP buildings
for the 97 buildings sold from December 1989 through December 1990
would amount to $22 million. These returns included property taxes, water
and sewer charges, sales taxes, down payment, debt service, mortgage
taxes, recapture from the federal government of Federal Section 17 grants
(which can occur only after the sale of the building), repayments by the
POMP contractor of certain rents and interest, and cost avoidance by
HPD.' 7
Finally, responding to community and activist concerns, the auditors
evaluated the rate and type of evictions in POM buildings.173 The media
had highlighted some extreme examples: one POMP manager, Henry
Sachs, boasted that he evicted 32 of 34 tenants from a building he managed
in the Bronx.174 HPD kept informed of legal proceedings against tenants
through the MMR, which distinguished between proceedings initiated be-
cause of nonpayment of rent, those initiated in response to squatting, and
those initiated for all other reasons.17 Auditors found that there were 955
legal proceedings against tenants in the 1,433 units studied (66.6%). 162 of
those proceedings ended in marshall-instituted evictions (113% of the total
number of units; 17% of the number of proceedings initiated). 76
169. Id. As of September 19,1990, only five buildings were in real estate tax arrears of
a year or more. After the audit, HPD advised the auditors that those firms which had been
in arrears had since paid their taxes. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at addendum 7. This was generally true of all DAMP buildings. As of 1989, no
DAMP building had ever been returned to the in rein cycle. SuPpoRT, supra note 52, at 25.
172. AuDrr, supra note 72, at addendum 7. It is unclear whether such savings were real
or illusory because of unaccounted for indirect costs.
173. Id. at 17. Auditors reviewed firms' rent rolls and invoices from lawyers hired by
eight contractors for a sample of forty-four buildings with 1,433 units from a populations of
the 133 buildings sold through POMP as of September 1988. They calculated the number of
legal proceedings that POMP firms began against tenants that ended in evictions for the
period between December 1979 and August 1988. Id.
174. Cheuvront, supra note 82, at 13.
175. AuDrr, supra note 72, at 17.
176. Id. HPD maintained that excessive turnover did not occur in POMP buildings.
HPD conducted a study of 118 buildings (4,664 dwelling units) which had been sold prior to
Fiscal Year 1988. Of the 118 buildings, information on turnover was returned for 100
(83.8%) buildings with 3,497 dwelling units. I-PD reviewed evictions in those buildings for
the period July 1, 1988 through June 30, 1989 and found that the total turnover was 10.8%
(the turnover rate varied widely between buildings, from as low as 1.7% to as high as
17.4%). This overall figure was almost the same as the citywide rate of 10.4% for a compa-
rable period and for a comparable population (HPD used the turnover rate of those who
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Responding to the Audit's finding that the eviction rate in POMP
buildings exceeded the City-wide rate, HPD made no apologies for this
policy and noted that it was necessary to bring legal actions against alleged
squatters and those tenants who, for whatever reason, continued to with-
hold their rent or some portion thereof.1 77 POMP's policy was to stabilize
the rent rolls of buildings in order to make them economically viable. One
aspect of this stabilization was a firm policy on rent arrears.78 HPD also
noted that it was necessary to attempt to evict those who sold drugs, con-
ducted other illegal activities, and otherwise disrupted the lives of their fel-
low tenants. 79 It is unclear, however, whether HPD accurately identified
which tenants were involved in such activities.
The auditors criticized POMP for failing to give tenants information
about potential rental or legal assistance. While POMP claimed that it con-
tacted contractors and tenants when legal proceedings were initiated, there
was no evidence of this effort in POMP's records.' s0 In its response to the
audit, HPD noted that HPD prohibited managers from initiating a nonpay-
ment action against any tenant on a Direct Vendor Payment plan and re-
quired the manager to attempt to contact the caseworker before starting an
action against a tenant who was receiving other public assistance from
HRA.'8 Furthermore, HPD stated that rental subsidies were provided to
all eligible in-place tenants, although it did not define who was 'eligible.' 18
3. The Business-Centered Advocacy Community
The business-centered advocacy community commissioned the
Mayor's Private Sector Survey to study the in rem housing programs.1 8 3
The Survey viewed HPD's mandate to be the recycling of in rem properties
moved in during the preceding 12 months). Id. at addendum 17. IPD further noted that
evictions only took place in 2.9% of the dwelling units. Id. at addendum 8. The auditors
criticized the HPD study because it only reviewed legal proceedings brought against tenants
after the buildings were sold to the contractors. The auditors reviewed legal proceedings
before the buildings were sold. HPD acknowledged that most legal proceedings were
brought prior to the building being sold. Id. at 18.
Note also that many tenants leave prior to a court judgment against them. Some may
simply agree to leave; others may leave under duress, during the earlier stages of a nonpay-
ment or holdover proceeding.
177. Id. at addendum 8. HPD may label licensees as 'squatters.' Note also that tenants
may have good reasons for not paying their rent, such as in response to the breach of the
warranty of habitability.
178. Id. at 17.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 18.
181. Direct Vendor Payments are paid directly to the landlord by the City's Human
Resource Administration. While this practice ensures that landlords receive rents from ten-
ants who might spend it on other legitimate or illegitimate needs, it limits a tenant's ability
to exercise any leverage over a landlord who is providing substandard services.
182. Id. at addendum 8.
183. PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY, supra note 144, at 1.
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and to avoid becoming the landlord of last resort."' Specifically, HPD had
a goal of reducing its portfolio of occupied buildings to an 'irreducible min-
imum' number of properties-approximately 10,000 units-to be managed
by the City on a permanent basis and used for emergency housing.185 In
order to reach this 'irreducible minimum,' HPD would need to rehabilitate
and dispose of 71,000 units through DAMP's existing three programs (TIL,
CMP, and POMP). 186 The Survey noted that in 1989 HPD spent over $134
million per year in direct operating and maintenance costs to manage its
occupied properties. Adding overhead costs, the annual amount rose to
nearly $185 million.'17
Among other areas, the Private Sector Survey studied the on-going
management of in rem properties, particularly as it related to information
systems, energy management, and rent collections.188 The Survey noted
that while the vesting of in rem buildings had slowed, it continued and was
expected to add 3,000 to 4,000 units per year over the next ten years.18 9
Yet, DAMP had sold only 16,000 units from 1979 through 1989 and its in-
ventory of unsold buildings continued to rise. 190 This build-up showed that
more units were being moved out of central management and placed in the
sales pipeline which reduced costs to the City. But it also revealed that
-PD was having difficulty selling the buildings. The difficulties were espe-
cially acute in the POMP program, where inventory had climbed 480%
from 1983 to 1989.191
The Private Sector Survey's authors believed that for each unit re-
cycled, "the City can save $2,100 in direct operating costs and also return
the property to the tax rolls." HPD projected that it could save $200 mil-
lion if it recycled 35,000 units from 1990 through 1995.191
The Private Sector Survey supported HPD's privatization strategy be-
cause its authors believed that community managers are better able to pro-
vide "the nurturing that HPD's troubled housing stock needs, and may be
able to do so more cost effectively."193 While noting that HPD had devel-
oped many innovative programs for the disposition of in rem buildings, the
184. SUPPORT, supra note 52, at 5.
185. Id. at 10.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 3. Costs include fuel, boiler repairs, utilities, superintendent and handy per-
son salaries, supplies, and open market purchase orders. Id.
188. The Survey also studied the strategies and programs for recycling properties from
HPD to community ownership and the rehabilitation of vacant buildings. "In totality, these
areas cover the full life cycle of a building from the time it is vested until recycled into
community management.. .. " Id. at 5.
189. Id. at 2.
190. PRrVATE SECrOR SURVEY, supra note 144, at 63.
191. SUPPORT, supra note 52, at 10-11.
192. Id. at 6.
193. Id. at 5.
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Survey was skeptical about whether HPD could achieve its goal of re-
cycling 71,000 units between 1990 and 2000.194
The Survey recommended new strategies to accelerate recycling, in-
cluding partnership agreements in which BPD and third parties would
jointly manage properties and long-term leasing arrangements in which
community or for-profit private groups assume complete responsibility for
managing the properties. 195 The rationale for these recommendations was
to increase the number of groups that could successfully rehabilitate and
manage in rem buildings.196
The Private Sector Survey also identified two major areas where all
DAMP programs could improve policies and procedures: prompt pay-
ments to contractors and after-sales assistance to contractors. 197 The Sur-
vey noted that each POMP and CMP manager and contractor who it had
interviewed had complained about the length of time it took to be
reimbursed. 198
The Private Sector Survey recommended creating a special After-Sales
Unit whose staff would be dedicated to monitoring sold TIL, CMP, and
POMP buildings. This unit would not only identify buildings that are
floundering to help prevent them from 'going under,' but would also docu-
ment whether private POMP managers were adhering to the ten-year and
fifteen-year sales restrictions.199 Acknowledging the political climate, the
Survey noted that the ability of POMP to achieve future sales would be
jeopardized if private managers did not adhere to the sales restrictions.20 0
It was also proposed that this After-Sales Unit could become a clearing-
house of information and referral for DAMP contractors.2° '
This After-Sales Unit would also be able to take on an increasingly
important role if -PD attempted to increase the rate of disposition. If it
were to quadruple its rate of disposition, HPD would need to abandon its
slow, low-risk approach to selling buildings (an approach that resulted in
the foreclosure of very few buildings sold through DAMP) in favor of a
faster, riskier approach.202 The After-Sales Unit would then act as a moni-
tor of this riskier approach. The Survey noted that DAMP already had the
groundwork laid for such a program: its Sales Unit monitored the water,
sewage, and tax payment rates of sold CMP and TIL buildings, notified
194. Id. at 6.
195. Other strategies included subsidy agreements in which third parties are given in-
centives to manage against pre-determined cost and performance standards, purchase op-
tions for partnerships between locally based non-profit housing developers, and the creation
of an apprenticeship program. PRIVATE SEcroR SURVEY, supra note 144, at 63.
196. Id. at 64.
197. SUPPORT, supra note 52, at 21.
198. Id. at 22.
199. Id. at 26.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 24-25.
202. Id. at 25.
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tenant associations and community non-profits of delinquencies, and urged
them to approach the Department of Finance to negotiate a payment
schedule if they were behind in these payments.P
3
The fact that so many buildings were old and in dismal condition led
some pro-POMP landlords to advocate for even higher rehabilitation subsi-
dies. 4 Some POMP landlords explicitly stated that they were more inter-
ested in reaping potential profits from appreciation and were less
interested in securing ongoing profits from rent rolls?0 5 Such an interest
raises the spectre of speculation and of the higher rents that would neces-
sarily follow from any such sales. However, this interest in subsidized reha-
bilitation is criticized by laissez-faire academics who, while believing that
the private sector should own and operate low-income housing, also be-
lieve that subsidies to private sector landlords interfere with the existing
for-profit low-income housing market, to the detriment of low-income
tenants. 20 6
The authors of the Private Sector Survey believed that POMP's fail-
ings were due in large part to an adversarial tenant-centered advocacy
community. The Survey identified the tenants' advocates as a major im-
pediment to the success of POMP and similar programs and reasoned that
the failure to dispose of more buildings "reflects strongly held views in
many communities that buildings should not be sold to for-profit
groups. 207
4. The Tenant-Centered Advocacy Community
The tenant-centered advocacy groups criticized by the Private Sector
Survey commissioned their own exhaustive studies of POMP and the other
HPD housing programs. The Task Force on City-Owned Housing (Task
Force), an organization composed of pro-tenant individuals and groups,
conducted two surveys of tenants living in in rem buildings, comprehen-
sively analyzing conditions in the Bronx and Brooklyn.
In the Bronx Survey, the Task Force conducted a survey of over 2,700
tenants in currently and formerly City-owned buildings in the Bronx and
203. Id.
204. A 1989 study by the Citizen's Housing and Planning Council found that 15% of in
rein buildings were old law tenements and 56% were new law tenements; more than 113 had
3 or more serious deficiencies, and I out of every 58 in rem units had indoor drug opera-
tions. Network, Part II, supra note 124, at 27.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., PETER D. SALINS, SCARcrry By DESIGN 5-6 (1992) (arguing that subsi-
dized and regulated municipal housing sub-markets "undercut the viability of the remaining
privately owned low income rental stock" and encourage unsustainable public support of
below-market rate housing).
207. PRIVATE SECTOR SuRvEY, supra note 144, at 63. See also, SUPPORT, supra note
52, at 12 (reporting that no POMP rehabilitation contracts were underway in Manhattan, "a
direct reflection of political opposition...").
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upper Manhattan to find out who these residents were, what kind of condi-
tions prevailed in their buildings, what form of ownership they preferred,
and related information. 208 This first survey focused on the Bronx because
it had many in rem buildings and because its buildings represented most of
209Thsuvthe DAMP sales programs. he survey reached tenants living in build-
ings sold through POMP or in the POMP sales pipeline, co-ops, buildings
in the TIL pipeline, and buildings in HPD's Central Management. 210 Be-
cause this study did not compare satisfaction levels in the buildings prior to
vesting with HPD, it could not definitively indicate whether problems were
due primarily to DAMP, BPD, or pre-foreclosure conditions. Nonetheless,
the survey gave a strong indication that POMP's efforts in the Bronx had
not lived up to Mayor Koch's promise of "efficient management." '211
The Bronx Survey found that buildings sold through POMP had the
worst conditions of all BPD programs, even though POMP generally re-
ceived a higher level of capital funding.212 Specifically, the Task Force
found that buildings currently being managed through POMP or sold
through POMP generally had much lower tenant-satisfaction ratings than
other HPD buildings.213
The Survey created a composite measure of building services, includ-
ing heat, hot water, electricity, plumbing, windows, and cleanliness. Ten-
ants in buildings sold through POMP reported the lowest levels of
satisfaction of all HPD programs considered.21 4 The Survey also found that
208. The Task Force Bronx survey team interviewed 2,700 Bronx residents living in 212
City-owned and formerly City-owned buildings. This sample of buildings represents 19% of
the City-owned and formerly City-owned buildings in the Bronx. The breakdown of re-
spondents and buildings by program type was:
Program Type Respondents Buildings
Central Management 1,065 (44%) 89 (42%)
DAMP POMP (pipeline) 177 (07%) 12 (06%)
Sold POMP 581 (24%) 53 (25%)
DAMP TIL 216 (09%) 20 (09%)
Co-ops 409 (17%) 37 (18%)
Total 2,448 (100%) 212 (100%)
The Bronx Survey, supra note 145, at 17-19. Data collected in Harlem as a part of this
survey has not been included in this article.
209. Id. at 17.
210. Id. at 18. The survey was not able to analyze tenant satisfaction in Community
Management Program buildings because it was not able to obtain a large enough sample to
obtain reliable data due to the relatively small number of CM buildings in the Bronx. Id. at
19.
211. What's more, the fact that POMP buildings were frequently the 'cream' of the In
rem housing stock and the recipient of the highest DAMP subsidies may indicate that
POMP did even more harm in the Bronx than even this survey indicates.
212. Harold DeRienzo, Summary of Findings, in HOUSING IN THE BALANCE: SEEKING
A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY FOR CITY-OwNED HOUSING, at i (Michele Cotton ed., 1993).
213. Id. at i to ii.
214. In sold POMP buildings, only a third of the tenants (as opposed to two-thirds of
those in co-ops) rated services as good or excellent. Even more, tenants in sold POMP
buildings were the only grouping in which a majority rated their apartments and buildings as
poor to fair. Id. at ii.
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security was identified as 'good' or 'excellent' only one-third as frequently
in sold POMP buildings as in tenant co-ops.2 ' POMP tenants rated the
services in their building as 'good' or 'excellent' less frequently than ten-
ants in other programs. Dissatisfaction with POMP was most striking when
compared to substantially higher tenant satisfaction in TIL co-ops, which
are managed by tenant groups.216 The starkest finding was that 60% of
tenants wanted to move from buildings sold through POMP, whereas no
more than 40% of the tenants in other programs wanted to move. 1 7 Only
9.4% of tenants surveyed would choose to have their building owned by a
private landlord. In contrast, 54.4% preferred tenant ownership21 8
The Task Force inferred from the Bronx survey that the greatest loss
of in rem units affordable to low-income tenants occurred in buildings sold
through POMP. Tenants in POMP buildings had a much shorter average
length of residence than tenants in other HPD buildings2 19 POMP build-
ings also showed a disparity in income distribution that suggested a signifi-
cant number of low-income tenants had been displaced. The Task Force
identified a 'missing middle' of tenants earning between $5,000 and $20,000
a year in POMP buildings.' One explanation may be that lower-income
tenants were either priced out, evicted, or harassed into leaving and re-
placed by a combination of higher-income tenants and highly-subsidized
homeless familiesrn
The Task Force conducted a second survey in Brooklyn that substan-
tially mirrored the Bronx survey in format but included some additional
questions?'m The survey reached tenants living in Central Management
215. The Bronx Survey, supra note 145, at 28.
216. Id. at 27. The same trend generally can be seen in management quality ratings.
Id. at 29. This also holds for the prevalence of drug problems in the buildings, but Centrally
Managed buildings also have substantial problems. Id. at 33. Some of the dramatic differ-
ence between POMP buildings and TIL buildings may be explained by the fact that TIL
tenants are necessarily involved in their buildings. As such, buildings that chose to go into
TIL may have a head start in creating a habitable environment. On the other hand, TIL
buildings have generally had lower capital repair funds than POMP buildings. DeRienzo,
supra note 212, at i1
217. After personal reasons, poor building conditions was the next most frequently
chosen reason given for moving. POMP tenants also cited high rents as the reason for
wanting to move, more so than tenants in other programs. The Bronx Survey, supra note
145, at 35.
218. Id. at 36.
219. lId at 21. POMP buildings averages were 1-2 years shorter than Co-op and TIL
buildings. Id.
220. DeRienzo, supra note 212, at iL
221. Id.
222. The Survey data was taken from questionnaires administered to 2,975 residents of
483 currently and formerly City-owned buildings located in Brooklyn Community Boards 1
through 8 and 16. The Brooklyn Survey, supra note 145, at 41-42.
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Buildings, POMP buildings, CMP buildings, HARP buildings, TIL build-
ings, and tenant cooperatives that had been sold through TIL (HDFCs) 3
While some of the Brooklyn Survey results confirmed those of the
Bronx survey, there were also substantial differences. Most notably,
POMP buildings appeared to be much better run in Brooklyn than in the
Bronx. While TIL and sold-TIL (HDFC) buildings remained the most
praised by their tenants, POMP and CMP buildings were adjudged to be
better homes than Central Management and HARP buildings2 4
The Brooklyn Survey found that POMP's average composite manage-
ment rating was squarely in the middle between HDFCs and TILs at one
extreme and Central Management at the other."5 POMP tenants reported
levels of harassment and predictions of moving well within the range of
other programs. 6 Unlike the Bronx survey, POMP tenants in Brooklyn
had an average length of residence similar to most other programs22 7 and
POMP tenants complained only slightly more than other tenants that their
rents were unreasonable.2-8 This indicates that some or all of POMP's
problems were not endemic, but depended on factors such as landlord,
building type, and location. This was reinforced by the fact that in some
Community Boards in Brooklyn, POMP performed very well, while in
others it performed worse than even Central Management.? 9
Brooklyn's POMP buildings did have some notable negative charac-
teristics. It appeared that POMP rents were higher than those of other
programs and that POMP charged higher rents more frequently.23 0 POMP,
along with HARP and Central Management, showed significantly lower
223. The breakdown of respondents and buildings by program type was as follows:
Program lype Respondents Buildings
Central Management 741 172
DAMP TIL 289 41
sold Co-ops 491 72




224. Id. at 10.
225. Id. at 27.
226. Id. at 35, 38.








228. Id. at 26. HDFCs did have substantially fewer complaints about rent reasonable-
ness than the other programs. Id.
229. 1& at 7.
230. Id. at 14, 20.
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tenant participation levels in tenant groups and community affairs z31 It
appeared that POMP tenants were most passive when it came to their
building and community.3 2
The Task Force's second report emphasized the numerous findings
that pointed to TIL as the most successful in rem housing program:
The Brooklyn Survey shows that the benefits of tenant coopera-
tive ownership do not end at the doorway of the building. The
dramatic reduction in crime and drugs evidenced in the tenant-
owned buildings benefits the whole neighborhood. Residents in
these cooperatively owned buildings also participate to a greater
extent in community affairs than residents in other programs, giv-
ing more of their time and energy to the improvement of their
communities.
3
More than half of all those surveyed preferred a tenant co-op for the future
of their building. Despite low ratings, the runner-up in terms of preference
was City ownership. Community non-profit and for-profit landlords were
rarely preferred."
The Brooklyn Survey also noted that all forms of sold-in rem housing
showed an increase in both tenant incomes and rental rates, indicating that
they all diminished the supply of housing for the poorest New Yorkers?
5
Tenant incomes averaged lowest for Central Management and HARP,
POMP and CMP were in the middle, and TIL and HDFCs the highest.23s
Although the 1992 Bronx Survey showed that POMP buildings ap-
peared to displace lower-income tenants and replace them with higher in-
come tenants, the Brooklyn Survey does not show that effect to the same
degree. Rather, it is Brooklyn's HDFC tenants who have the highest in-
comes of those surveyed in that borough
3 7
In comparing data from the Bronx and Brooklyn Surveys, the Task
Force report noted that in the Bronx, City ownership and management per-
formed somewhat better overall than in Brooklyn. Conversely, private for-
profit management performed somewhat better overall in Brooklyn than in
the Bronx.2 8 Yet, it also noted that in both surveys, Central Management
and HARP were most affordable to the poorest tenants 3 9
231. Id. at 41.
232. Id. at 44.
233. Task Force on City-Owned Housing, Brooklyn Summary 10 (undated summary of
Brooklyn Survey, on file with author) [hereinafter Brooklyn Summary].
234. Id. at 9.
235. See The Brooklyn Survey, supra note 145, at 7 (noting that "all sales programs
tend to show a drop off in the use of the housing for low-income residents," though the
severity of the impact differed).
236. Id. at 14. However, the only real differences of significance were seen in HDFCs
(higher) and HARPs (lower). Id.
237. Id. at 14-15.
238. Brooklyn Summary, supra note 233, at 9.
239. The Brooklyn Survey, supra note 145, at 16.
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The Task Force report concluded that the City was misallocating hous-
ing dollars because TIL, the most preferred program, was getting the few-
est dollars. The Task Force also argued that tenant organizing itself,
regardless of ownership model, improves the quality of housing and argued
that the City's recent decision to decrease funds for organizing was
counter-productive.240
Though not emphasized by the surveys' final analysis, the survey re-
suits suggest POMP was not a uniformly badly run program. While POMP
failed to achieve its goal of maintaining apartments as a resource for the
poorest New Yorkers, the same could be said of TIL. Only Centrally Man-
aged and HARP housing maintained the availability of low-income apart-
ments. In short, no one model has simultaneously achieved maximum
affordability, quality, and financial stability.
5. Other Voices
Others in the tenant-centered advocacy community found little to
praise in POMP buildings. A City Limits editorial outlined many common
criticisms after looking at one of the first buildings to enter POMP and
evaluating POMP's goals.241 Tenants reported evictions, harassment, ware-
housing of vacant units, heat and hot water shortages, and other code viola-
tions. Other advocates saw POMP as running counter to DAMP's explicit
goal of providing long-term housing affordability for low-and moderate-
income communities. 242 Critics also pointed to the heavy commitment of
public funds for renovation of POMP buildings and rent subsidies given to
POMP tenants in excess of those given to other in rem programs as evi-
dence of cost inefficiencies. 43
Some in the tenant-centered advocacy community asked whether
POMP was essentially a welfare program for landlords. After receiving
rent subsidies for their units, capital improvement expenditures that
reached as high as $15,000 per unit, and bargain basement sales prices as
low as $1,800 a unit, POMP landlords were not barred from ultimately sell-
ing their buildings to the highest bidders.2  The first buildings sold
through POMP had a bar on resale of only 5 years and at least one landlord
240. Brooklyn Summary, supra note 233, at 16. The Task Force's regression analysis
supports the argument that tenant organizing improves the quality of housing. The data
does not, however, demonstrate in itself that TIL can be expanded even though tenants
prefer it to other DAMP programs. Il
241. Beverly Cheuvront, Misdirected Pride, Crry LiMiTs, Aug.-Sept. 1988, at 2.
242. Coalition Against POMP, Comments On Proposed Rules Governing The Private
Ownership Management Program (Jan. 1991) (unpublished memorandum, on file with au-
thor) (predicting that POMP "will actually exacerbate the problem by reducing the amount
of housing affordable to low and moderate income tenants").
243. Cheuvront, supra note 82, at 2.
244. Giordano, supra note 131, at 3.
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was able to sell buildings and receive profits in excess of 1000% of the
original investment.2 45
E. POMP Compared to TIL
TIL has been studied sporadically, 2" and while it is generally praised
for its tenant ownership model (where tenants buy their building for $250
per unit, with resale restrictions), it is criticized for its slow rate of sales and
the fiscal instability of those buildings that are sold. 47 In 1988, HPD Com-
missioner Biderman acknowledged that TIL co-ops had a "very, very good
track record," but he insisted that private owners made repairs more
quickly than tenants and got to the self-supporting stage more quickly as
well.248 In 1994, B-PD Commissioner Deborah C. Wright stated that there
was apparently less interest in TIL than was commonly believed because
the required classes for TIL tenants were underenrolledV 49 Others have
criticized the City for not planning TIL around the other responsibilities of
the tenants.250
245. Cheuvront, supra note 82, at 16. The City reacted to this potential for profiteering
by extending the period barring a resale to 10 years and a conversion into a coop or condo-
minium to 15 years. Network, Part II, supra note 124, at 26.
246. Doug Turetsky, We Are the Landlords Now, Community Service Society (1993)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author); Vicki Oppenheim, The Mutual Support Net-
work Model: An Evaluation of Mutual Support Networks for HDFCs in New York City
(1991) (unpublished M.S. Thesis, Columbia University, on file with author); Helene Clark,
The Future of Limited Equity Housing in New York City: Residents Struggle for Stability
(August 31, 1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Settlement Housing Fund,
Inc., Nonprofit Housing Development: Ownership and Management (March 9, 1988) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
247. For positive press accounts of TIL buildings, see Anthony DePalma, The Rocky
Road to Tenant Management, N.Y. Tirms, June 26, 1988, § 10, at 1, (describing a typical TIL
building's experience); Sam Howe Verhovek, On One Woman's Grit, a Building Revives,
N.Y. TmEs, August 22, 1987, § 1, at 29 (describing leadership in TIL buildings); David W.
Dunlop, New Hope for the Abandoned Tenant, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 25, 1982, § 8, at 7 (describ-
ing TIL procedures). See also SuPPORT, supra note 53, at 12 (describing characteristics of
successful TIL buildings).
For negative accounts, see Matthew Josefowicz, New Windows Installed in Foster
Mom's Apartment, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 17, 1993 at 29 (describing a TIL building divided
into factions); Matthew Josefowicz, Not a Quick Fix: Clashes Delay Building Repairs, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Aug. 12, 1993 at 31 (describing how conditions went from bad to worse after a
centrally managed building went into TIL).
See also Johnson v. City of New York, 578 N.Y.S2d 977, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (remand-
ing petitioner's application for ani apartment to tenant selection committee due to possible
discrimination on the basis of marital status); Dorothy M. Keller & Marie M. Runyon, Ten-
ant Managers, N.Y. Tmms, July 17, 1988, § 10, at 20 (arguing that while tenant ownership is
good, mandatory tenant management is not).
248. DePana, supra note 247, at 1 (describing a typical TIL building's experience).
249. Andrew White, City for Sale, Crry LiMrrs, June-July 1994, at 10.
250. Advocates criticize HPD for holding TIL classes in the evening in Lower Manhat-
tan. They note that requiring tenants to travel long distances at night in high crime areas
may act as a disincentive to even the most committed TIL participant. See Penny Loeb, City
Tops Slumlord Business: Study Shows Worst Housing Operated By Government Agency,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 3, 1993, at 6 (reporting criticisms that the City does not help tenants
enter TIL). The Brooklyn Survey also indicates that many tenants are not aware of TIL as
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TIL advocates note that some of these problems are attributable to the
fact that the City has historically underfunded TIL buildings when com-
pared to those in other DAMP programs. They also note that the City gave
POMP contractors more time than TIL lessees to decide to enter the pro-
gram and to take ownership of the building. Recently, the City has put TIL
buildings on a much longer rehabilitation schedule than other DAMP pro-
grams, meaning that potential TIL participants must wait longer for neces-
sary repairs.2 51 Despite all of its flaws, TIL has sold more units than any
other DAMP program. 2z5
Ill.
NEIGHBORHOOD ENTREPRENEURS PROGRAM (NEP)
On September 14, 1994, the Giuliani Administration announced a new
initiative, "Building Blocks!" Despite the demise of POMP, the center-
piece of Building Blocks! is the conveyance of HPD buildings to private
for-profit managers. 5 3 During his campaign, Giuliani had made the priva-
tization of City-owned housing a focal point of his housing plan and
claimed that by "saving millions through the process of divesting itself of
property," the City "can, instead of trying to run property, concentrate on
stimulating private ownership. '2 - 4 Giuliani hopes that such privatization
will both reduce municipal spending in the face of an immense structural
budget deficit and stimulate the economy.
2 55
A. Expectations
In the first stage of the plan, the City intends to shift about 250 apart-
ment buildings, with roughly 2,500 apartments, to private managers over a
nine-month period. The City has budgeted approximately $50,000 per unit
for renovating the housing prior to being sold.256 About 1,000 units are to
be conveyed to community based non-profits under the Neighborhood Re-
development Program (NRP), which resembles the old Community Man-
agement Program (CMP). An additional 500 units are to be allocated to
an alternative form of management. Only 16% of tenants in Central Management buildings
are aware of the TIL program. The Brooklyn Survey, supra note 145, at 64.
251. Kim Nauer, Soft Sell, CITY LiMITs, Apr. 1995, at 9.
252. Guiliani Confronts In Rem Dilemma, THE URBAN PROSPECT: HousING, PLAN.
NING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 4 [hereinafter THE
URBAN PROsPEcr].
253. Office of the Mayor, New York City, Press Office, Mayor Giuliani and HPD Com-
missioner Wright Unveil Comprehensive Initiative to Return City-Owned Buildings to Re-
sponsible Private Owners 1 (Sept. 14, 1994) (press release #410-94, announcing Building
Blocks! program) [hereinafter Press Release]; Shawn G. Kennedy, Mayor Cutting City's
Roster of Buildings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at B1.
254. Shawn G. Kennedy, Defaults Rise, Posing Peril for Housing, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
1994, at B1.
255. Id.
256. See Breaking the Cycle, supra note 2, at Schedule 4B.
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the TIL program. The remaining 1,000 units are to be turned over to local
entrepreneurs under the new Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program
(NEP).2 5
Ultimately, the Building Blocks! programs (NRP, TIL, and NEP) are
slated to dispose of 3,000 buildings with nearly 28,000 units.258 The City
plans to dispose of 8,949 occupied residential units through NRP, 7,458
through TIL, and 11,588 through NEP. The City plans to dispose of an
additional 3,763 vacant residential units through NEP 5 9 These three pro-
grams, with NEP as the favorite, are meant to sell buildings prior to the
start of rehabilitation "in order to minimize the period of City-ovnership
and to benefit the tenants with an earlier transfer to private management
and a shorter, more efficient construction period."' ' 0
NEP is similar to POMP in that it intends to sell buildings to for-profit
firms. There are, however, important differences. The first difference be-
tween NEP and POMP is that NEP's goal is to sell smaller buildings. More
than third of the apartments are in buildings of four units or fewer, and 70
percent are in buildings with 10 units or fewer. NEP buildings have 8 units
on average.261
A second difference is NEP's focus on clustering buildings to be reha-
bilitated. Many of these buildings are old tenements, brownstones, and
row houses that have been carved into rooming houses with more tenants
than their systems were built to handle?262 NEP is designed to improve
entire blocks by clustering occupied and vacant buildings, rather than reno-
vating individual buildings in isolation.2 63 These clusters will allow the City
to mix potentially profitable units with those that are likely to be unprofita-
ble.2 4 Promoting NEP, Mayor Giuliani noted that "an often uncoordi-
nated development approach" interfered with past efforts to rejuvenate
neighborhoods and "as a result, despite extensive investment in homeown-
ership and rental housing, communities remained scarred by scattered City-
owned buildings and lots.
''26s
A third difference is that NEP plans to contract with a different type of
landlord than POMP. A common complaint about POMP was that most of
257. Kennedy, supra note 254, at B1.
258. Alan S. Oser, The Ax Is Poised on Low-Income Housing Efforts, N.Y. Tibms, Oct.
22, 1995, § 9, at 7.
259. Breaking the Cycle, supra note 2, at Schedule 4B.
260. CITY OF NEv YORp, CrrY BUDGET. FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 45 (1996).
261. White, supra note 249, at 8.
262. Shawn G. Kennedy, Working to End Landlord Role, New York Faces Hurdles,
N.Y. Tmms, Sept. 24, 1994, § 1, at 21.
263. The New York City Housing Partnership, The New York City Neighborhood En-
trepreneur Program: A New Public-Private Initiative 5 (Aug. 12,1994) (unpublished propo-
sal, on file with author) [hereinafter NYCHP]. These clusters, or submarket areas, are
comprised of two to eight square blocks. Id. at 3.
264. Id.
265. Press Release, supra note 253, at 3.
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the landlords were perceived as outsiders, residing in upstate New York,
Long Island, New Jersey and Connecticut.266 HPD Commissioner Wright
at one time described a potential purchaser of these small buildings not as
someone who wants to buy up a thousand units, but rather as "the guy,
who is a local superintendent who may want a couple of buildings and live
in the ground floor of one of them. ' 267 NEP is designed to minimize the
legal and regulatory burdens facing the small property owner.2 68 While
NEP was designed to attract locals and small minority-owned firms, known
in the program as "Neighborhood Entrepreneurs," the first round suggests
that they have not succeeded in doing SO.
2 69
NEP seeks to do more than rehabilitate and dispose of in rem build-
ings. As Commissioner Wright noted in 1994:
One of the biggest criticisms of HPD is that so much of the eco-
nomic power bypasses local communities. The vendors are from
outside of the community. Many times the developers are. Even
some of the consultants are. People are really emphasizing local
participation because we want to harness some of the power of
government expenditure and attract private funds to create jobs
and some economic spin-off.
270
By linking NEP to local businesspeople, the City hopes to bypass these
problems and recreate the local real estate industry of brokers, owners, and
managers which was virtually wiped out in the 1960s and 1970s when build-
ings and neighborhoods were abandoned en masse. Officials expect that
hundreds of local jobs will be created as a byproduct of this plan.2 71
NEP is also funded somewhat differently than POMP. Construction
financing will be provided by community development banks. Long-term
funding will come, in part, from Section 8 subsidies, special awards to those
building clusters located in the Empowerment Zone, Federal Low Income
Housing Tax Credits, and federal HOME dollars used to partially finance
rehabilitation.272 The tax credits and HOME dollars impose ten- to fifteen-
266. Michele Cotton, In Rem Report 9 (Apr. 13, 1995) (unpublished draft, on file with
author).
267. White, supra note 249, at 8-9. Preliminary studies of the first group of entrepre-
neurs shows that they have more in common with POMP contractors than with "local tal-
ented folks." See Summary of Application Information, Violations Printouts, and Other
Information for Entrepreneurs Selected for NEP by Applications Submitted in Response to
10/94 HPD RFQ (Nov. 29, 1995) (tax arrears update report, on file with author) [hereinafter
Summary of Applications].
268. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
269. Summary of Applications, supra note 267, at 2-14.
270. White, supra note 249, at 10.
271. Peter Grant, Many Non-Profits Fail in City Landlord Role, CRAIN'S NEw YORK
Busir.mss, Sept. 19, 1994, at 3. See also Cotton, supra note 266, at 9; THE. URBAN PROS.
PEcr, supra note 252, at 4.
272. Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program: General Outline 4-5 (Feb. 6, 1995) (un-
published memorandum, on file with author) [hereinafter NEP Outline].
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year restrictions on some portion of tenant incomes and rents. Vacant
units, financed by city capital funds, would be rented at market rates to
provide a source of internal cross-subsidy.273
A final difference is NEP's public commitment to minimize tenant dis-
placement. Commissioner Wright stated that "[t]here won't be displace-
ment" under the new program.274 Although rents in occupied apartments
will increase, they will be restructured according to existing DAMP guide-
lines.275 Wright claims that existing housing subsidies such as rent vouchers
and tax credits will cover the difference between operating expenses and
what poor tenants could afford.276 In addition, HPD intends to use cross-
subsidies between vacant and occupied units in order to provide additional
funds to protect existing tenants from displacement.27 Finally, HPD states
that tenants have a right to return to their original building, a promise
backed by a written agreement that is to be signed prior to tenant
relocation.27
Building Blocks! is part of a larger change in in rem policy for HPD3 79
The Giuliani Administration is ideologically opposed to government ad-
ministered housing programs and is opposed to further vesting of proper-
ties that are in arrears. Announcing its new policy, the City noted that New
273. NYCHP, supra note 263, at 5.
274. White, supra note 249, at 9.
275. HPD & NYCHP, Request for Qualifications: Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Pro-
gram 8 (Oct. 21, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter RFQ]. In a representative notice
sent to tenants of a building that had been preliminarily selected for NEP, the rents were set
at $55.00 per zoning room (studio at $137.50; one bedroom at S192.50; two bedroom at
$247.50). HPD, Office of Housing Management and Sales, Division of Alternative Manage-
ment Programs, NEP, Notice of Preliminary Selection Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Pro-
gram 1 (Jan. 9, 1995) (unpublished document, on file with author) [hereinafter Preliminary
Selection].
276. Kennedy, supra note 254, at BI; White, supra note 249, at 8. HPD will calculate
reasonable rents as 30% of income. NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 6. Note, though, that
single persons, undocumented aliens, and persons whose housing does not meet federal
standards cannot receive subsidies. Nor can those who are classified as mere occupants or
licensees by the courts. Squatters are also ineligible.
277. RFQ, supra note 275, at 3. Cross-subsidies are created by renting vacant units at
area market rates in order to offset lower rents paid by existing tenants. "Vacant apart-
ments may be rented to families earning no more than 165% of the current HUD area
median income standard adjusted for family size (currently $68,800 for a family of four)."
l at 3. In addition, if the restructured rent (plus utilities) is more than 30% of the tenant's
income, the tenant may apply for an Interim Payment Agreement with HPD to have the
rent reduced until rental subsidies are made available. Preliminary Selection, supra note
275, at 1. See also, Rachelle Garbardine, A New Program is Rehabilitating Some 1,200
Rental Apartments in New York City, N.Y. Tirms, May 17, 1996, at D9 (some vacant apart-
ments will be subsidized for families making less than 60% of median income in the City,
with average rent for a two-bedroom apartment averaging $525 per month; similar apart-
ments, unsubsidized, will have an average rent of $650 per month).
278. NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 7.
279. The Giuliani Administration's in rem policy is based on the following objectives:
to maximize real estate tax revenue for City, to maximize preservation of the affordable
housing stock while minimizing the City's exposure in addressing distressed buildings, and
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York City is nearly unique amongst municipalities in its management and
rehabilitation of tax foreclosed housing.2"'
An Arthur Andersen study calculated that as of July 1994, the overall
life cycle cost of the City's in rem housing stock was $10.6 billion, of which
$4.4 billion is expended to prepare properties for return to private manage-
ment.281 The study found that buildings taken through the in rem process
has an average disposition cost of more than $2,200,000 per building.
282
The study concluded that most of the in rem properties returned to private
management "will never become positive revenue generators over the use-
ful life of the capital improvements which the City has funded. 283 As a
result of these findings, the Giuliani Administration stopped vesting of
buildings for arrearages.284
The City is investing $573 million in programs to deliver financial and
technical assistance to private landlords so they can better maintain and
upgrade their buildings in order "to prevent abandonment of privately-
owned buildings and forestall their entry into City ownership." 285 These
programs include an 'early warning system' to identify and prevent build-
ings from being abandoned and a Small Property Owners Advocacy Unit
that will allow landlords to self-identify buildings in arrears.286 This change
in policy is coming at the same time that Finance Department data reveals
that tax foreclosure filings were up by nearly 30 percent in 1993 and that
the redemption rate, which was over 90 percent for years, has plum-
meted.287 While the Giuliani policies are intended to keep the City out of
the business of managing housing, they are coming at a time when the low-
income housing market is particularly fragile.
B. Structure
The NEP plan divides responsibility between HPD, community orga-
nizations, tenants, Neighborhood Task Forces, Community Development
Banks, the Department of Business Services, and The New York City
Housing Partnership.
to seek long-term solutions to improve housing viability. PRESERVATION PoMcIPS, supra
note 38, at 6.
280. Breaking the Cycle, supra note 2, at 5.
281. Id. at 10.
282. Id. at 8.
283. Id. at 9 (italics in original).
284. Shawn G. Kennedy, Tenants in Limbo as New York Stops Foreclosing, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 9, 1995, § 1, at 1.
285. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, MESSAGE OF THE MAYOR, THE CITY OF
NEW YORK EXECUTIVE BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 181 (1996).
286. PRESERVATION PouciEs, supra note 38, at 7, 11.
287. Kennedy, supra note 254, at B1 (reporting that the "number of buildings in which
owners have fallen seriously behind in their taxes has risen sharply in the last five years,
from 13,737 in 1989 to 18,003 in 1993"); THE URBAN PROSPECT, supra note 252, at 4.
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HPD is responsible for site selection and planning, designation of
Owners/Managers, rehabilitation financing, rent restructuring and rental
subsidies, tax abatements, property disposition ombudsman for small prop-
erty owners, operating support during the net lease period, and structure
project financing.288
Community organizations are responsible for the stabilization of
buildings in clusters, tenant training and support, and the monitoring of
building progress. Tenants are responsible for the development of tenant
associations, participation in neighborhood redevelopment activities, mo-
bilization of community resources and programs, and the organization of
building watches and neighborhood security. The Neighborhood Task
Forces will assist in site selection and planning, assist in identifying poten-
tial owners and managers, give input on qualifications of potential owners
and managers, and give ongoing feedback to participants3m
The Community Development Banks will underwrite the rehabilita-
tion financing, participate in project financing, service rehabilitation loans,
and inspect and monitor construction. The Department of Business Serv-
ices' role is to make business loans and to reach out to potential contrac-
tors, subcontractors, and suppliers.290
The City has arranged with the New York City Housing Partnership
(Partnership), a nonprofit development organization affiliated with the
New York City Chamber of Commerce, to assist in the oversight of the
Neighborhood Entrepreneurs and provide them with technical support3191
The Partnership's involvement in affordable housing is not new. In 1988,
the Partnership initiated the Neighborhood Builders Program to increase
the participation of minority contractors and community-based entrepre-
neurs in the affordable housing industry.29 The Partnership has developed
a two-pronged plan for its role in NEP.293 The first component is entitled
"Community Based Planning and Monitoring of Performance." The sec-
ond is entitled "Technical and Financial Assistance to Neighborhood
Business." 294
The linchpins of the Community Based Planning component are the
Neighborhood Task Forces. The City designed the Neighborhood Task
288. NEw YoRK CIY DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION & DEvELoPMFrr,
BUILDING BLoCKS!: THE GiuuANi ADMINISTRATION'S INITIATIVE TO RETURN CITY-
OWNED PROPERTY TO REsPONSIBLE PRrVATE OWNERS (1994) (unpaginated prospectus, on
file with author) [hereinafter BUILDING BLOCKS!] (providing low-interest rate loans through
City Capital Budget funds and providing real property tax exemption under § 11-243 of
New York City's Adminitradve Code or under Article 16 of the New York State General
Municipal Law); NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 5.
289. BUILDING BLOCKS!, supra note 288.
290. Id.
291. Kennedy, supra note 254, at B1.
292. Hovde, supra note 4, at 45-47.
293. NYCHP, supra note 263, at 5.
294. Id.
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Force to "incorporate community concerns and resources in planning and
implementing Building Blocks" '295 HPD and the Partnership will convene
the Neighborhood Task Forces to meet with Community Boards, commu-
nity-based nonprofit groups, local boards of realtors, and business associa-
tions. The community-based nonprofits are intended to be the foundation
of these Neighborhood Task Forces because of their credibility with tenants
and knowledge of neighborhood problems and resources. Perhaps the
most important responsibility of the Neighborhood Task Forces will be to
regularly evaluate the progress of participating Entrepreneurs.
Some of the community groups in the Neighborhood Task Forces will
contract with the Partnership to monitor and evaluate building progress
and to facilitate the relationship between the Neighborhood Entrepre-
neurs, the community, and the tenants. The groups will also receive con-
tracts to provide tenants and cluster area residents with the support
necessary to participate in an employment demonstration project through
which unemployed tenants may secure private sector job opportunities
with Entrepreneurs and contractors.296
The Partnership has received funding from the Rockefeller Founda-
tion to create the Employment Pilot Program, which will direct 75 to 100
entry level jobs created through the rehabilitation and management of
NEP buildings to tenants living in the buildings. Tenants will be screened
and assessed for employment readiness and training needs will be coordi-
nated by local non-profit social service providers affiliated with Neighbor-
hood Task Forces.z97
The Technical and Financial Assistance component of the plan will be
modeled on the Partnership's Neighborhood Builders Program. 29s The
Partnership will organize mentoring and industry support, access to financ-
ing, and other assistance to prospective owner-managers. The Partnership
will also form an Industry Advisory Group, composed of bankers and rep-
resentatives of the real estate industry, that will assist HPD and the Part-
nership in structuring the financial, technical assistance, and mentoring
package.2
99
295. NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 3.
296. NYCHP, supra note 263, at 4; Press Release, supra note 253, at 3.
297. Hovde, supra note 4, at 48. (explaining that "selected tenants will be referred to
the South Bronx overall Economic Development Corporation (SOBRO) and the Strive
Employment Group, who have been contacted by the Partnership to provide a work readi-
ness program, and assistance in job placement").
298. The Neighborhood Builder Program was designed to help minority-owned firms
compete for housing construction and rehabilitation contracts in New York City. Its de-
signer, the New York City Housing Partnership, considered it a success. COMMUNITY PART-
NERSHIP DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MAINSTREAMING MINORITY BUILDERS: NEW
YORK CITY'S PUBLIC-PRIVATE PROTOTYPE (1993).
299. NYCHP, supra note 263, at 4-5.
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C. The Neighborhood Entrepreneurs
Neighborhood Entrepreneurs must all meet certain minimum criteria,
although HPD and the Partnership may waive them at any time.30 0 These
companies will be required 1) to be based in one of the communities
targeted by NEP, 301 2) to have at least 50 units under current management,
or have managed an average of 50 units over the last 3 years, 3) to own or
have a substantial ownership interest in no more than 250 units housing,3m
and 4) to be able to demonstrate a capacity to manage another 100 units in
the area. 3 Those applicants with histories of poor management will be
disqualified. 31 Once these criteria are met, applicants are evaluated ac-
cording to the following criteria:
" management experience and capacity
" financial ability and capacity
" rehabilitation experience
" ability to work with government and community organizations
" 'other' considerations (such as whether the applicant has long-
term ties to the neighborhood)
30 5
300. RFQ, supra note 275, at 5, 8.
301. Id. at 5 (defining neighborhood-based as any one of the following: the Neighbor-
hood Entrepreneur's primary business is located in one of NEPs target neighborhoods; the
Neighborhood Entrepreneur has lived in a target neighborhood for at least three years; or
the Neighborhood Entrepreneur's business generated at least 75% of its gross revenues
from a target neighborhood during each of the last 3 years).
302. Id. The units owned by each principal will be counted cumulatively to arrive at
the total units owned by the applicant.
303. NYCHP, supra note 263, at 6. Experience with multi-family housing owned and
managed by the applicant, managed for private owners, or managed under contract with or
employment by governmental agencies or pursuant to Court appointment may be consid-
ered relevant. The Neighborhood Entrepreneur must also have experience with rehabilita-
tion or repair of occupied multi-family housing. Finally, the Neighborhood Entrepreneur
must meet one of the following criteria regarding financial resources in full and be within
50% of the maximum limit as specified in the other criteria: maximum gross annual busi-
ness revenue (3 year average) of $1.5 million; maxmum personal and corporate net worth
(exclusive of primary personal residence) of $1.5 million. The Neighborhood Entrepreneur
must also have the ability to commit $50,000 cash to the project or obtain a S50,000 line of
credit. The Partnership will provide access to financial institutions, if necessary. RFQ,
supra note 275, at 5.
304. Automatic reasons for disqualification include arson conviction (or pending
cases); tenant harassment conviction (or pending cases); City mortgage foreclosure proceed-
ings or substantial tax arrears; previous record of default on work performed under govern-
ment contract; previous de-designation pursuant to an HPD decision after award of a
project or contract; in rem foreclosure (applies to Applicant as well as Applicant's spouse,
business entity substantially controlled by Applicant, or any successor in interest); outstand-
ing Housing Code violations of a serious nature (C violations) in properties owned or man-
aged by the Applicant; or conviction for fraud, bribery, or grand larceny. RFQ, supra note
275, at 5. Note that HPD and the Partnership can waive these bars at any time. Id. at 8.
305. Il at 6. Other considerations include anything that will promote the NEP effort.
Therefore, additional weight will be given to applicants who have long term residential or
business ties to the Target Neighborhood; whose principals andfor workforce include resi-
dents of Target Neighborhoods; who demonstrate a history of commitment to hiring local
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HPD weighs residential management experience and capacity and ties to
the neighborhood most heavily, with the other factors given somewhat less
weight. 0 6
The Partnership has secured private funds to contract with non-profit
community organizations to assist the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs with
tenant assessment, tenant orientation, and community outreach. 307 These
community organization will track the progress of buildings and the overall
improvement efforts in cluster areas. The City will prepare plans and spec-
ifications for rehabilitation. Soon thereafter, HPD will turn over responsi-
bility for building management to the Entrepreneurs, who will receive a
development fee not in excess of 10% of the project cost.3 08 HPD will
transfer the title of the building over to the non-profit Neighborhood Part-
nership Housing Development Fund Corporation created by the Partner-
ship to temporarily hold title to the buildings.
30 9
Companies selected for NEP must make a commitment of up to three
years to manage properties under the supervision of HPD and the Partner-
ship prior to taking title.310 HPD and the Partnership will evaluate the
quality and timeliness of the construction work. The Neighborhood Entre-
preneur will also be required to complete a Monthly Fiscal Report to track
rent billings, rent collection, legal actions, occupancy, total income, and ex-
penses for each building. The Entrepreneur must also prepare a Monthly
Management Report for each building, tracking information about tenant
issues and the resolution of complaints.
3 11
If Entrepreneurs successfully rehabilitate and manage these buildings,
they will be entitled to purchase them. At the time of purchase and after
rent restructuring, rent stabilization laws will again apply.3 12 HPD and the
Partnership expects the package of rents, subsidies and debt will permit
Entrepreneurs both adequate cash flow and a reasonable return on their
investment.1 3 Resales are subject to HPD approval for 15 years after sale
residents and are willing to participate in a pilot employment program for tenants; and
whose principals, if the applicant is a joint venture, have a history of working together. Id.
306. -PD & NYCHP, Questions Submitted About the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs
Program Request for Qualifications 13 (Nov. 21, 1994) (on file with author).
307. NYCHP, supra note 263, at 6. Neighborhood Entrepreneurs will be required to
work with tenants during the transition period, keeping tenants informed of rehabilitation
plans and providing necessary services. They are also required to work with the not-for-
profit community organization that is responsible for developing the temporary relocation
plan prior to construction. Fmally, the Neighborhood Entrepreneur will be expected to
participate in a pilot employment program for tenants. RFQ, supra note 275, at 3.
308. RFQ, supra note 275, at 4; NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 4. A recent article
indicates that this translates into a one-time fee of $1,500 per unit and $35,000 annually per
cluster. Garbardine, supra note 277, at D9.
309. NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 5.
310. NYCHP, supra note 263, at 6.
311. RFQ, supra note 275, at 4; NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 7.
312. NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 7.
313. NYC-P, supra note 263, at 5-6.
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to the Neighborhood Entrepreneur in order to deter short-term specula-
tion and to maintain the housing as a resource for the targeted
populations.1
D. Implementation
The Implementation Plan for NEP's first year demonstration project
began by choosing clusters of vacant and occupied buildings for rehabilita-
tion and disposition. HPD and the Partnership jointly issued a Request for
Qualifications (RFQ) to invite potential Neighborhood Entrepreneurs to
compete for the first 1,000 units." HPD received 90 completed applica-
tions by the due date in November 1994.316 Eleven companies were se-
lected for the first round.317 Neighborhoods chosen for the first round of
NEP are located in the South Bronx, Central and East Harlem, and Brook-
lyn's Bedford Stuyvesant and Crown Heights. 318 Seventy-nine buildings
were scheduled for entrance into NEP in April and May 1995 9
The implementation of NEP has not been fully consistent with its de-
sign. Although the RFQ and other documents indicate that serious build-
ing code violations would act as a bar to an applicant, 0 this was waived in
a number of cases. NEP profiles indicate that this waiver was made in
some cases where an Entrepreneur had 'inherited' violations from a previ-
ous owner and had plans to correct them.321 Yet, research by the Task
Force on City Owned Housing indicates that many Entrepreneurs own or
manage buildings with a substantial number of serious Building Code vio-
lations that were not acknowledged by HPD and the Partnership in their
profile of the first-round Entrepreneurs. 3 2 Several of the accepted land-
lords also owe tens of thousands of dollars in tax arrears on buildings that
they own.323
Furthermore, half of the first group of Entrepreneurs have business
addresses that are not located within their cluster, indicating that they are
not truly 'local.' Only one Entrepreneur manages fewer than 100 units and
314. NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 6.
315. RFQ, supra note 275. As of January, 1997, there are an estimated 2,700 units in
230 buildings in NEP. J.A. Lobbia, As the City Gets Out of the Landlord Business, Who's
Taking its Place?, VILLAGE VoicE, Jan. 21, 1997, at 41.
316. Hovde, supra note 4, at 82-83.
317. Id. at 45. That number has since increased to 22. Lobba, supra note 315, at 41.
318. RFQ, supra note 275, at 2.
319. Nauer, supra note 251, at 8.
320. RFQ, supra note 275, at 5; NEP Outline, supra note 272, at 4.
321. See, e.g., Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program Description of Program Appli-
cants Designated for the First Round 4-5 (Feb. 10, 1995) (unpublished profiles of Larry
Hirschfield and C.E. Property Management, Ltd., on file with author).
322. Summary of Applications, supra note 267, at 2-14. See also, Lobbia, supra note
315, at 41 (some Entrepreneurs have buildings with well over 100 'C' violations and one
Entrepreneur, 1Mlton Manning, runs buildings with a total of 975 'C' violations).
323. Id.
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at least two manage more than 2,000 units, a far cry from the 'superinten-
dent' model that Wright had earlier proposed. 24
Finally, it appears that the buildings targetted for NEP have turned
out to be slightly larger on average (10 units) than the original NEP propo-
sal (8 units). Rehabilitation costs have also been substantially higher
($62,000 per apartment) than originally planned ($50,000).325
Sarah Hovde, currently a researcher at the Community Service Soci-
ety, has conducted a study of the first stages of NEP in Central Harlem.
32 6
Hovde documented that the NEP model has been tentatively accepted by
those community groups that are involved in the Neighborhood Task Force
and that criticism has been muted when compared to that of POMP.
3 2 7
In Central Harlem, Hovde reported that potential NEP clusters were
identified by HPD and the Partnership by January 1995 and the Central
Harlem Neighborhood Task Force chose two out of the four site clusters.3 28
Tenants in identified buildings received letters in late January and early
February telling them they could opt out of NEP by applying to TIL.329
HPD presented its choice of Entrepreneurs to the Neighborhood Task
Force as an accomplished fact. Some Neighborhood Task Force members
objected to this process, but HPD did not reconsider its decision, claiming
that NEP's timeframe required speedy action.330 Task Force members did
not criticize HPD's choice of Entrepreneurs. 3
The Central Harlem Neighborhood Task Force meetings are not open
to the public and Hovde reported complaints by Task Force members that
HPD tightly controlled the agenda. As a result, some members have had
their own monthly ad hoc meetings without HPD present. The members
interviewed by Hovde described their relationships with HPD as coopera-
tive, although there has been some uneasiness and some conflict. Gener-
ally, it appears that local 'players' want to stay within the NEP process in
order to have some influence. 32
324. Id.
325. Garbardine, supra note 277, at D9 (reporting on average size and costs of the first
1,196 NEP apartments).
326. Hovde, supra note 4.
327. The Neighborhood Task Forces studied by Hovde were composed of organiza-
tions that had both financial ties and similar agendas to HPD. HPD excluded a community
organization (Action for Community Empowerment) that has taken adversarial stances to
HPD policies, particularly those relating to NEP. Id. at 77.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 64. A building needs the azsent of 60% of the units (including vacant units)
to opt out. Once an application has been completed, the tenants have 90 days to fulfill all
other TIL requirements including forming a tenant association, electing officers, and attend-
ing classes in building management. Apparently, this is a difficult process and severe time
frame for tenants. Id,
330. Id. at 83.
331. L
332. Id at 79-80.
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There has been little commentary from the business-centered advo-
cacy community about NEP, although the Citizens Housing and Planning
Council has noted that there is some "skepticism about whether inexperi-
enced entrepreneurs can handle difficult rehabilitation projects with ten-
ants in place."333 A principal of one of Harlem's largest real estate
companies believes that "[l]ocal entrepreneurs are best able to manage
these buildings. But if it's going to work, whoever takes the buildings wil
have to have an easier time removing some of the tenants. Some don't pay
rent; some tear up apartments. You have to get better tenants." 334
The tenant-centered advocacy community, however, has many of the
same criticisms it had of POMP. When NEP was first announced, Harry
DeRienzo of the Task Force on City-Owned Housing asked about its long-
term affordability:
What happens when the city is out of the picture? Gradually, the
housing opportunities for the working poor will be lost. It is not
feasible for for-profit owners to operate housing where tenants
earn, on average, less than $7,000 a year. The only way that this
program can work is if much of it is eventually rented at market
rates.335
Professor Saegert, also of the Task Force, "worried that there is not
more tenant participation 33 6 in the design of NEP. Hovde's research
seems to support Saegert's concerns about local participation and she cau-
tions that HIPD is implementing NEP in a top-down manner that is in con-
flict with its stated procedures.337 Hovde's findings should not be
overstated, however, as she notes that all of those groups who have been
asked to participate in the Central Harlem Neighborhood Task Force have
agreed to do so, albeit with some trepidation.
31
Michele Cotton, another Task Force member, has made some prelimi-
nary findings regarding the design and implementation of the Building
Blocks! program as a whole.339 She notes that the Giuliani Administration
has chosen to discontinue the placement of homeless families in in rem
housing. While this may benefit other needy populations, homeless fami-
lies are left with fewer and fewer available housing resources in the City.340
333. THE URBAN PROSPECr, supra note 252, at 4.
334. Kennedy, supra note 262, at 21. This statement by Eugene Webb is not necessarily




337. Of course, tenant participation and community participation are two different
concepts, but the failure to include local community groups may very well indicate that
tenants are excluded as well.
338. Hovde, supra note 4, at 93.
339. Cotton, supra note 266.
340. Id. at 19-20.
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Cotton notes that the effects of this policy change are compounded by the
Giuliani Administration's decision to amass vacant in rem apartments so as
to make NEP more financially attractive. These changes combine to exac-
erbate the housing shortage emergency in New York City for low-income
households.
Cotton also finds that the design of NEP does not differ substantially
from that of POMP in key respects. In particular, she finds that NEP land-
lords are not required to be that much more 'local' than POMP landlords
were. POMP generally required that its contractors be familiar with the
characteristics of the housing stock they were interested in managing and
POMP firms were only allowed to buy buildings near their currently owned
properties. Cotton points out that it is unclear whether NEP standards are
in fact any more stringent.341 Monitoring standards may not be substan-
tially different either, particularly in light of recent severe staffing cuts at
-PD.342
Yet, some voices in the tenant-centered advocacy have been cautiously
positive. In addition to those interviewed by Hovde, City Limits inter-
viewed community organizers who indicated that they welcomed NEP and
some of the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs. 4 3 What is perhaps most strik-
ing about the reception of NEP by the tenant-centered advocacy commu-
nity is that there is little stridency in its tone, and prejudgments of its
success are few and far between. Besides certain structural arguments
about the role of NEP within the greater housing market and other con-
cerns about failures in its design, few commentators have dismissed NEP
out of hand. Future debates, it seems, will be about whether HPD is suc-
cessful in implementing the program according to its stated goals.
IV.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
While any evaluation of NEP can only be provisional at such an early
stage in its implementation, it is clear that in significant ways NEP, like
POMP, has failed to live up to its own criteria for success. Yet, much less is
clear when POMP and NEP are compared to other HPD programs and
evaluated in the broader context of in rem housing generally. Five areas
deserve particular attention in analyzing the POMP and NEP strategy of
341. Id. at 8.
342. Id. at 8, 14-15.
343. Nauer, supra note 251, at 10. The article indicated that some tenants in buildings
chosen for NEP were happy with the Neighborhood Entrepreneur selected for their build-
ings. ACORN's Helene O'Brien, an organizer working with these tenants, found that HPD
and the Partnership were responsive to the concerns of tenants with whom she works. Id.
Yet, another Task Force member who is also an employee of the Partnership indicated that
at least one of the chosen Neighborhood Entrepreneurs has a "less than stellar reputation."
Id. See also, Lobbia, supra note 315, at 41 (describing mixed reaction to early implementa-
tion of NEP).
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selling in rem housing to for-profit landlord: a) the selection of buildings,
tenants, and owners, b) monitoring, c) efficiency and equity, d) coordina-
tion with other government services, and e) legal issues.
A. Selection of Buildings, Tenants, and Owners
Few commentators have evaluated the criteria by which buildings were
chosen for various HPD programs. The disposition strategies for POMP
and NEP each have an implicit logic. Both programs presume it is desira-
ble to return buildings to the tax rolls as quickly as possible. Given such a
presumption, the City may have reasoned that large firms were best suited
to manage and then purchase the many large buildings under HPD control
when POMP was implemented. With NEP, there is an analogous reason-
ing: now that BPD has so many small buildings, it wants to tailor its dispo-
sition to less experienced managers who want to run smaller buildings.
Another aspect of NEP that deserves closer attention is HPD's prac-
tice of amassing vacant apartments in order to make buildings more attrac-
tive investments for NEP Entrepreneurs. Because vacant units and vacant
buildings can command higher rents, the NEP program may actually be
encouraging higher vacancy rates (at least in the short term). It is also
important to consider how profit-oriented strategies selects tenants. NEP,
like POMP, allows some rents to rise to market rates in order to produce
profit for the landlords. The designers of NEP have chosen to deal with the
tension between low-income tenants and profit seeking landlords by divid-
ing low-income people into two classes: current, legal in rem tenants and
everyone else. Current in rem tenants, if IPD deems them 'legal,' are sup-
posed to receive the benefits of a renovated building and rent subsidies,
provided by tax credits and public assistance grants. Those classified as
mere occupants, licensees and squatters, however, are not offered any
assistance in maintaining their current tenure. Nor do potential tenants re-
ceive any guarantees about the affordability of in rem units.
The manner in which HPD notifies tenants about the potential disposi-
tion of their buildings creates tension between its programs. In NEP, as in
POMP, tenants are sent notices telling them that they have been selected
for the program and that they have 60 days to opt out and enter TIL. The
decision to place tenants in a reactive stance has the benefit of maximum
flexibility for HPD, but may come at the cost of creating tenant apathy and
antipathy.3" A recurring complaint of those who champion TIL as the
best hope for long-term solutions to affordable housing is that tenants are
given little time to organize as a cooperative and are therefore pushed into
programs such as POMP and NEP.3 5 Thus, HPD's emphasis on speed in
344. Note that HPD, in contrast to its lax approach toward informing tenants about
TIL, uses an extensive outreach effort to contact potential for-profit landlords about NEP
and gives landlords from I to 3 years to make the final decision to buy an HPD building.
345. See Nauer, supra note 251, at 9-10.
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its for-profit landlord programs (POMP and NEP) may be interfering with
the long-term stability of its tenant-centered program (TIL).
The selection of buyers for POMP and NEP buildings may also be
problematic. On paper, both programs require landlords experienced with
similar housing stock and neighborhoods and HPD has designed NEP to
maximize local participation. It is questionable whether NEP can remain
local where POMP did not. By requiring certain amounts of experience
and capital, NEP will exclude the local 'superintendent' proposed by Com-
missioner Wright as the typical participant in the program. More likely, the
NEP landlords will include the larger, more experienced type of firm that
POMP had attracted.
B. Monitoring
Commentators have done a comprehensive job of evaluating POMP's
monitoring systems. The Office of the Comptroller audit noted that there
were monitoring deficiencies relating to the correction of conditions in
buildings sold through POMP, the placement of homeless families in
POMP, and field inspections made by POMP coordinators.34 6
Mirroring the criticism of the Office of the Comptroller, the Private
Sector Survey found that buildings sold through POMP were not moni-
tored effectively and suggested that the City pay particular attention to en-
suring that private POMP managers adhere to the ten-year and fifteen-year
sales restrictions. 47 Comprehensive monitoring would not only ensure
that POMP was well run, but would also have helped POMP avoid the
political blunders that interfere with HPD's long-term disposition strategy.
The Survey also recommended that a more disinterested party should over-
see the for-profit landlord's performance.348
HPD seemed to take many of these criticisms to heart when it
designed NEP, which attempts to improve monitoring in a number of ways.
The non-profit Partnership will act as a monitor of the entire program and
local non-profit groups will have contracts to monitor local for-profit land-
lords. While the Partnership and some Neighborhood Task Force members
receive money from HPD, those members without HPD contracts can act
as independent community monitors. Currently, however, the Neighbor-




POMP and NEP reflect a faith that the free market can provide hous-
ing in the most efficient way to low-income New Yorkers, but it is unsettled
346. AuDrr, supra note 72, at Schedule 2.
347. SuPPoRT, supra note 52, at 26.
348. PRIVATE SECrOR SURVEY, supra note 144, at 63.
349. Hovde, supra note 4, at 70.
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whether POMP and NEP are in fact efficient uses of City and federal
funds. The costs associated with in rem housing are substantial, particularly
the direct costs of rehabilitation and operation subsidies. On disposition,
these costs may be offset by expected revenues to the City for taxes, mort-
gage payments, water and sewer fees, as well as by savings from reduced
operating costs. However, even if the expected revenues and savings fully
offset the costs, this does not mean the sales to for-profit firms are the most
efficient use of public funds when compared to other options. Empirical
research should replace ideology in the search for answers to the following
question: do POMP and NEP landlords provide the best services at the
best price or are New York City taxpayers providing these landlords with a
subsidy that is euphemistically labelled 'profit'?
D. Coordination with Government and Community Efforts
Commentators have criticized I-PD for failing to integrate its disposi-
tion programs with other City services and programs. Some have noted
that drugs and crime have overwhelmed in rem buildings, particularly those
that are not fully occupied. 50 Others have suggested that various aspects
of the regulatory and legal systems, including the Housing Code and land-
lord/tenant law, have stymied attempts to dispose of City-owned
housing.351
NEP attempts to address these problems by concentrating resources
into limited areas. By clustering vacant buildings with occupied ones, NEP
seeks to make the City's services more available by creating a critical mass
of reinvestment in a small geographic area. Other components of the
Building Blocks! program are meant to complement these efforts by assist-
ing small landlords in the neighborhoods targeted by NEP. Whether NEP
will be successful in integrating services with those delivered by other City
agencies and efforts remains unclear.
E. In Rem Housing and the Law
New York State judges have had a significant role in shaping in rem
policy, particularly in suits brought against POMP. There is every reason
to believe that advocates will bring similar suits against NEP if the City
fails to avoid the flaws of its predecessor program.
In a 1984 article in this journal, Andrew Scherer outlined potential
legal theories that might be pursued in support of the rights of in rem ten-
ants, including those based upon due process, the New York City Charter,
Article 17 of the New York State Constitution, and Uniform Land Use and
350. See, eg., The Bronx Survey, supra note 145, at 32; The Brooklyn Survey, supra
note 145, at 33 (noting that HDFCs in both the Bronx and Brooklyn have significantly less
of a problem with drugs than other in ren buildings, and that Central Management and
HARP buildings in Brooklyn have significantly greater problems with drugs).
351. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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Review Procedures . 2 Tenants have indeed relied upon these theories and
the New York State courts have been generally responsive to in rem ten-
ants' procedural claims, although unresponsive to their substantive ones.
The New York City Charter in effect at the time that Scherer wrote his
article contained provisions that required the City to allow written public
comment on proposed regulations. 53 The revised Charter demands an
even greater role for the public: in addition to providing an opportunity to
make written comments, the new Charter calls for "a public hearing unless
it is determined by the agency in writing, which shall be published in the
notice of proposed rulemaking in the City Record, that such a public hear-
ing on a proposed rule would serve no public purpose. 3 54 This may indi-
cate to the courts that the City should be held to an even higher standard
regarding public comment than it had been in the past.
Scherer also suggested that communities take advantage of planning
procedures provided by the New York City Charter §197-a to 'pre-emp-
tively' establish in rem policy in their communities.3 55 The Charter has
since expanded the community's role by adding §2707, which establishes a
process for community planning of service systems at the district level.35 6
Sections 197-a and 2707 offer the possibility of proactive, community-based
responses to the in rem crisis. They are based upon the idea that a commu-
nity can have a say in community planning, but only if it chooses to. As the
courts seem to have limited themselves to ensuring only procedural guaran-
tees, the City Charter may offer the only (and, as of yet, a largely unex-
plored) recourse for substantive community input into in rem policy.
As noted above, POMP's design had elicited a series of lawsuits that
have highlighted its failings and interfered with its sales agenda. In Laure-
ano v. Koch,357 the trial court referred to the New York State Constitu-
tion's 'unique' due process clause,358 its provision relating to housing for
352. Scherer, supra note 47, at 968-72.
353. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1105-b (1985).
354. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1043(d) (1992).
355. Scherer, supra note 47, at 971-72. Uniform Land Use and Review Procedures
were governed by the previous N.Y. City Charter § 197-c, and regulations promulgated
thereunder.
356. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2707 (1996). Under section 2707, each agency with service
districts within the community districts and boroughs must prepare annually "a statement of
its service objectives, priorities, programs and projected activities within each community
district and each borough for the new fiscal year, if requested by the respective community
board or borough board."
357. 454 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. 1982), rev'd, 473 N.Y.S.2d 445 (App. Div., 1st Dept.
1984), rev'd as moot, 479 N.E.2d 821 (1985).
358. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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low income persons,359 and its long history of affording enhanced due pro-
cess protections to its own citizens. The court found for the tenants, ex-
tending State Constitutional due process protections beyond those granted
by the United States Constitution.360
The Appellate Division overruled the trial court3 61 It found that in
rem tenants had no constitutionally protected interest in their apartments
which give rise to a legitimate expectation that their rents would be kept at
levels permitted under rent control and rent stabilization laws.3 It also
found that, because rents were not set according to a standard formula, the
restructuring of rents in in rem housing did not constitute the 'fixing of
charges' forbidden by the City Charter.363 Although the Appellate Divi-
sion overturned the Supreme Court, it did acknowledge, in principle, that
"decent, safe and adequate low rent.. .housing at rents low income tenants
can afford is an interest of the nature which merits due process protec-
tion."' 3 4 The tenants appealed.
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and remitted the matter
to the Supreme Court, with directions to dismiss the proceeding for moot-
ness because the City, acknowledging the requirement to promulgate regu-
lations pursuant to §1105(b) of the New York City Charter, had
promulgated regulations. 365
Courts soon took to the Laureano trial court's reading of the State
Constitution and the City Charter. In Sicherman/POMP v. Jenkins,3 1 the
court found for the tenant when the private landlord failed to follow
DAMP regulations. 367 In Union of City Tenants v. Kochim the court held
that sales of buildings through POMP were subject to the protections of
359. N.Y. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 1.
360. 454 N.Y.S.2d at 959. See also 157 West 123rd St. Tenants Ass'n v. Hickson, 531
N.Y.S.2d 742,743 (Civ. CL, NY County 1988) (holding that TIL was subject to due process
limitations, as designee of City owner); Johnson v. City of New York, 578 N.Y.S.2d 977, 980
(Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding that TIL tenant organization may not discriminate against single
mother applicant).
361. 473 N.Y.S.2d 445 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 1984), rev'd as moot, 479 N.E.2d 821
(1985).
362. 473 N.Y.S.2d. at 449.
363. Id. at 448.
364. Id. at 449 (quotation marks omitted).
365. 479 N.E2d at 821.
366. 567 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Civ. Ct. 1989).
367. Id. at 567 ("The City as a landlord and the petitioner as the City's managing agent
are bound by the provisions of the New York State Constitution. Pursuant to Article 17 of
the Constitution, the City of New York is obligated to provide assistance to the needy,
including provision of shelter.") (citations omitted).
368. 574 N.Y.S.2d 695 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 1991).
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City Charter §1105(b). 369 The court reiterated that petitioners were enti-
tled to due process protection to the extent that they, as low-income ten-
ants, have a protected interest in decent, safe and adequate low-rent
housing.
370
NEP seems vulnerable to many of the same legal challenges brought
against POMP. Tenant advocates are concerned that NEP has not yet
promulgated rules of its own to comply with the new Charter's more ex-
pansive notice and opportunity to be heard provisions.371 The Task Force
on City Owned Property's In Rem Organizer's Sourcebook suggests that
NEP's rules and regulations may not survive challenge in court.372 NEP's
failure to provide an official opportunity for tenants to comment on rent
increases, to contest final selection into NEP, and to contest NEP's
programmatic rent restructuring may violate Union of City Tenants' due
process standards. The unofficial NEP guidelines contained in its Request
for Qualifications documents grant complete discretion to HPD about such
important things as the qualification of Neighborhood Entrepreneurs. 3
As with POMP, courts may be inclined to invalidate guidelines that grant
complete discretion to the City.
While NEP apparently shows care for current 'legal' tenants by pro-
viding rental subsidies, it makes no promises for future tenants. The fate of
future tenants is a primary concern of the advocacy community, and advo-
cates may argue that potential in rem tenants have standing to bring law-
suits against the City.
37 4
Hovde has raised legal questions about NEP's innovative structure.
The significant administrative and policy-making role of the Partnership (a
non-governmental entity) in NEP (a City program) is unprecedented. 37
The Partnership's role and its accountability to the public are not clearly
defined. Without a clear position by the City, it may be left to the courts to
articulate the legal boundaries of the Partnership's participation in NEP.
F The Future of NEP and New York City's In Rem Housing Crisis
NEP will either be an innovative program that has addressed commu-
nity and legal concerns or it will be POMP redux. Viewed from the per-
spective of one who primarily favors rapid disposition, it may be a effective
strategy if it is not blocked by the courts or public outcry. Viewed from the
369. Id. at 696.
370. Id.
371. N.Y.C. CHARTER §§ 1043, 1045.
372. IN REM Organizer's Sourcebook, supra note 63.
373. RFQ, supra note 275, at 8.
374. See, e.g., In re Lee, 574 N.Y.S.2d 695 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1991) (holding that
potential tenants have standing to request injunction against sale of certain POMP proper-
ties to known slumlords).
375. Hovde, supra note 4, at 7.
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perspective of one who favors tenant and community participation, it
shares many of the faults associated with POMP.
NEP is better funded than POMP and is designed to have more com-
munity participation than POMP. It provides explicit protection to tenants
who must relocate during rehabilitation. It increases the number and types
of organizations monitoring the for-profit landlords. And, perhaps tell-
ingly, it has generally, so far, avoided negative media coverage.
But given that it has many characteristics in common with POMP, it
may be similarly criticized in years to come. Like POMP, NEP does not
ensure that its units will be maintained as long-term housing for low- and
moderate-income tenants. The NEP program may encourage evictions of
tenants paying low rents. It does not guarantee tenants adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard. HPD has already waived NEP's own
guidelines in the first year. Some of NEP's first Entrepreneurs are from
outside of the local community for which they have been selected. Some
have poor records of maintaining housing, and some have substantial prop-
erty tax arrears. In short, the first round does not engender complete faith
in NEP's implementation strategy.
What is more, NEP has some new characteristics that may even make
it worse than POMP. It amasses vacant apartments in a City with an over-
whelming need for more low-income housing. It also ignores the needs of
homeless families. These characteristics may lead to debilitating legal chal-
lenges or future unpopularity.
All }-PD programs have had serious flaws: even the often praised TIL
program offers no panacea. What remains most clear is that New York
City's in rem disposition programs have not lived up to their potential and,
more generally, the City is far from developing an equitable and efficient
response to its acute housing crisis for low-income households.
The tenant-centered advocacy community should consider reevaluat-
ing its role as Cassandra to HPD's Troy. Tenants have interests that are
clearly in conflict with those of the bureaucracy at HPD. Expecting H.PD
to fund tenant organizing so that tenants will be more empowered (and
therefore more difficult) consumers of HPD's services is unrealistic. These
advocates should agitate harder for different sources of tenant-organizing
funds that are independent of HIPD. In rem policy will benefit more from a
clearly adversarial approach than an implicitly adversarial approach.
An unspoken aspect of the in rem debate is that nearly all of the
speakers, including most of the tenant-centered advocates, are funded by
HPD. Such a system clearly does not encourage the most open dialogue.
Rather, we need structural changes that would maximize the independence
of at least some organizations that are involved with in rem policy.
Studies and experience indicate that all four sectors - the City, the
for-profit sector, the non-profit sector, and tenant groups - have some-
thing to offer to in rem housing management. The City should rely on
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strong organizations whatever form they take. This may mean that differ-
ent solutions work for different neighborhoods and for different buildings.
Too often, one senses that those who dominate the in rem policy de-
bates are presiding over a funeral, while accusing each other of murder. In
the meantime, many in rem tenants live in wretched housing, hoping for a
solution to New York City's housing crisis that works both equitably and
efficiently. In the context of such overwhelming needs, ideology should not
overcome pragmatism. Abandonment has been with New York City for
more than twenty years now. The real estate market has fluctuated, as
have the political winds and the fortunes of numerous programs designed
to combat the in rem problem. It is time to develop a more comprehensive
response that takes into account the lessons of experience.
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